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Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach 
Jeffrey A. Roy∗ 
This article proposes a game-theoretic model of the Carolene Prod-
ucts notion of a “discrete and insular” minority. It analyzes the democ-
ratic process as a bargaining game in which players can form coalitions 
with other players. When the game is repeated, players have an incentive 
to maintain a stable majority coalition to seek a long-term advantage 
for themselves at the expense of an excluded minority. The article applies 
this model to several issues in Equal Protection doctrine, particularly 
the definition of a suspect classification. A suspect class is likely to be 
formed around a trait that is a natural focal point for the formation 
and maintenance of stable majority and minority coalitions. The arti-
cle identifies several qualities that such a trait is likely to possess and ar-
gues that these provide a means of determining whether discrimination 
based on a certain trait warrants heightened scrutiny. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
An important idea underlying Equal Protection doctrine is the 
notion that certain groups of people are not able to rely on the de-
mocratic process to protect themselves from exploitation by a major-
ity. This idea was articulated in the famous footnote 4 of United 
States v. Carolene Products Co.:  
[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special 
condition, which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those 
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minori-
ties, and [so] may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.1 
The Carolene Products approach recognizes that certain groups, 
because they are in some sense separate from the political majority, 
are unable to enter into coalitions with the groups forming the ma-
jority and thereby to protect their interests in the political bargaining 
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 1. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938). 
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game. This breakdown in the democratic process provides a role for 
the judiciary to prevent discrimination against these groups. 
Carolene Products, which involved a prohibition on the interstate 
shipment of “filled milk,” was not itself an Equal Protection case. 
Footnote 4 was simply intended to describe situations in which a 
presumption that a statute is constitutional might be inappropriate. 
The Supreme Court first referred to Carolene Products in the Equal 
Protection context in a series of cases applying strict scrutiny to laws 
discriminating against aliens.2 Since then, the Court has considered a 
group’s status as a discrete and insular minority when deciding 
whether that group is a suspect class warranting a heightened level of 
scrutiny.3 However, the Court has not articulated a single test for de-
termining whether classification based on a particular trait is suspect.  
In addition to examining the effect of the trait on political power, 
the Court has also asked whether the trait is immutable, whether it is 
relevant to the classification’s purpose, and whether those who bear 
the trait have suffered discrimination in the past.4 Much controversy 
exists over the proper place of the Carolene Products analysis in this 
mix, or, indeed, whether it deserves any place at all.5 
This article suggests that the Carolene Products formula is a use-
ful approach to many questions of Equal Protection law and pro-
poses a game-theoretic model of the ways in which discrimination 
can arise and be perpetuated in a democracy. The model hypothe-
sizes that discrimination—particularly discrimination by the state—
persists to a large extent for rent-seeking purposes.6 That is, laws that 
 
 2. Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 642 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 
365, 372 (1971). 
 3. See, e.g., City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 445 (1985) (argu-
ing that the mentally retarded are not “politically powerless”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 
427 U.S. 307, 313 (1976) (stating that “old age does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ 
group”); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973) (concluding that 
residents of poorer school districts were not “relegated to such a position of political power-
lessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process”). 
 4. See infra notes 115–18 and accompanying text. 
 5. See infra notes 93–95 and accompanying text; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. 
Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 290 (1978) (finding that status as discrete and insular minority not pre-
requisite for application of strict scrutiny); Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 657 (Rehnquist, J., dissent-
ing) (“It would hardly take extraordinary ingenuity for a lawyer to find ‘insular and discrete’ 
minorities at every turn in the road.”); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Is Carolene Prod-
ucts Dead? Reflections on Affirmative Action and the Dynamics of Civil Rights Legislation, 79 
CAL. L. REV. 685 (1991). 
 6. For the purpose of this article, “rent seeking” is used in a broad sense to encompass 
any situation in which one group seeks to obtain an economic benefit for itself at the expense 
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discriminate often provide an economic benefit to a majority at the 
expense of a minority. Subordination of a particular group can occur 
if that group is persistently excluded from majority political or eco-
nomic coalitions, thereby becoming the subject of rent seeking 
rather than being able to gain benefits for itself. 
Following the Carolene Products model, the democratic process 
in a rent-seeking situation can be modeled as a cooperative game in 
which players can form coalitions, and a coalition with the majority 
of power can determine how to allocate a pot of money among the 
players. Under an idealized view of the democratic process, the 
“players” in a democracy (individuals or interest groups) can bargain 
on an equal basis with other players. Over time, each group will end 
up in a majority coalition a fair amount of time relative to its size and 
political power. The model presented in this article shows that this 
idealized picture may be less likely to occur in practice than it would 
seem at first glance. When the game described above is played re-
peatedly, players have a competing long-term incentive to form a 
stable winning coalition that votes every round to distribute the en-
tire pot among its members and to maintain the coalition, even 
against very attractive offers from other players. This strategy gains 
rent for the majority at the expense of a stable minority. Other fac-
tors, like the cost of renegotiating an existing coalition, can make a 
majority coalition even more stable. 
Under this model, persistent discrimination based on a particular 
trait can be viewed as a focal point strategy—an equilibrium strategy 
that is particularly likely to be selected because of its shared salience. 
Members of a democracy have a wide variety of majority coalitions to 
choose from. Coalitions based on certain traits, however, may be 
particularly likely to form and be stable, because they follow the lines 
of existing social groups or because they provide a low-cost means to 
seek rent. Such a trait may serve as a focal point for coalition forma-
tion in a repeated rent-seeking game. A focal point that persists over 
time may eventually be internalized by society as a social norm to 
which people thoughtlessly adhere. 
A game-theoretic model has several advantages over existing 
process-oriented and economic theories of discrimination, particu-
larly as a guide to Equal Protection law. First, it describes why dis-
 
of another group. As discussed in Part III.A., below, rent seeking can be defined even more 
broadly to encompass “psychic rents” like status. 
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crimination against certain groups is likely to occur. When people 
perceive themselves as competing with others for jobs, public goods, 
or other benefits, they form coalitions with others in order to obtain 
benefits for their group and, by extension, for themselves. Second, it 
provides a potential explanation for the persistence of discrimination 
over time. To the extent discrimination provides benefits to the 
members of a majority group, that group has an incentive—albeit an 
unvoiced one—to continue to discriminate. In particular, if a focal 
point exists for the distribution of benefits, members of a group fa-
vored under the current structure may resist changing the focal 
point. A focal point that has been internalized as a social norm may 
be even more stable because people gain value from simple adher-
ence to that norm. Finally, a game-theoretic model can explain why 
discrimination is particularly likely to be based on certain traits, 
rather than others. Under this model, a trait is likely to be used for 
discrimination if it serves as a natural focal point for the formation of 
a stable majority coalition in a rent-seeking game. A trait is likely to 
serve as a focal point if it minimizes the costs associated with forming 
and maintaining a stable coalition and the costs of rent seeking based 
on that trait. For example, a trait that is visibly evident is more likely 
to give rise to discrimination than a trait that is discoverable only at 
some cost. 
A game-theoretic model naturally addresses several controversial 
issues in Equal Protection law. First, it provides guidance regarding 
the types of traits that should be deemed suspect classifications and 
thus give rise to heightened scrutiny. Because traits that act as focal 
points for coalition formation are particularly likely to be used to dis-
criminate, one inquiry in determining whether a classification should 
be deemed suspect is whether it might be used to form stable rent-
seeking coalitions. Certain traits—for example, those that are immu-
table, are evident, and divide society into well-defined groups—seem 
particularly likely to be used that way. Second, the model may help 
explain why Equal Protection law serves a necessary function in a 
democracy. The Equal Protection Clause can address situations in 
which normal democratic process has broken down in that certain 
groups persistently end up in the minority. These situations tend to 
occur when a particular trait is being used to form a stable majority 
coalition in order to seek benefits for that coalition at the expense of 
a minority. Under this model, then, Equal Protection law can serve 
at least two functions: in the short run, to identify situations in 
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which this sort of stable rent seeking is occurring and prevent it; and 
in the long run, to change social norms regarding discrimination by 
preventing certain types of traits from being used as focal points for 
rent seeking. 
This article is divided into two parts. The first part analyzes the 
democratic process using cooperative game theory and shows that a 
group of players has some incentive to play a strategy that discrimi-
nates against another group of players. It discusses other reasons for 
long-term stability of rent-seeking coalitions, including the function 
of an existing equilibrium as a focal point, the use of punishment 
strategies, and coalition-formation costs. It also analyzes historical 
examples of the use of discrimination for rent-seeking purposes. The 
second part of the article describes the implications of this approach 
for Equal Protection doctrine, focusing on the definition of a dis-
crete and insular minority and its application to suspect classifica-
tions. 
II. A GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CAROLENE PRODUCTS 
This section outlines a game-theoretic model of discrimination 
along the lines of the coalitional bargaining scenario envisioned in 
Carolene Products. The central idea of the model is that in certain 
situations a democracy can be modeled as a rent-seeking game in 
which players or groups can form coalitions with other players or 
groups in order to seek benefits for themselves. In this type of game, 
players have an incentive to form a majority coalition to seek rent at 
the expense of a minority and, if possible, to maintain the coalition 
against any counteroffer by the minority. 
For the purposes of this section, I will analyze the democratic 
process by means of a simple game—“divide-the-dollar”—that has 
been used by political scientists and economists for many years.7 The 
game assumes that a group of people is to divide up a fixed pot of 
money among its members by majority vote. For simplicity, we will 
assume that the game has three players—Players 1, 2, and 3—and 
that the pot is one dollar. This game represents a pure rent-seeking 
situation because any gain for one player must come at the expense 
of another player. In other words, it is a zero-sum game. 
 
 7. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: 
LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 147–50 (1962); PETER C. 
ORDESHOOK, A POLITICAL THEORY PRIMER 288–91 (1992). 
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While this particular example is very simple, it can be generalized 
to situations involving any number of players and to situations in 
which players have varying amounts of power. In applying this model 
to real-world situations, the “players” may represent individuals or 
groups. For example, a political situation might be represented as a 
multiplayer game in which each player is a member of a legislative 
body. A three-player game might capture a labor negotiation in 
which the players are the employer, majority employees, and minor-
ity employees. In real-world situations, players may have varying 
amounts of “votes,” which generally represent power to influence 
the outcome of the game. Sources of power may include actual 
numbers of votes, economic power, control over media, or ability to 
retaliate against opponents. Thus, a group may lack a majority of 
power in the sense of being able to influence political outcomes even 
if it constitutes a numerical majority. Differing amounts of power can 
be captured in a game-theoretic model by varying the number of the 
players’ votes in the game. 
This simple model has proved useful in addressing a variety of is-
sues relating to the structure of a constitutional democracy. In their 
groundbreaking work The Calculus of Consent, James Buchanan and 
Gordon Tullock use modified versions of this model to analyze a va-
riety of voting structures and to address issues like the effects of a 
majority-voting rule and of a bicameral legislature.8 Coalitional game 
theory has been used to analyze a variety of other constitutional is-
sues, including privacy and equal protection.9 The following discus-
sion details how the simple cooperative game described above can be 
used to model discrimination. 
A. Coalition Formation in a Simple Rent-Seeking Game 
This section applies the three-person divide-the-dollar game to 
the problem of discrimination in a democracy. Examining players’ 
incentives in this game can help explain why people might form 
long-term, stable majority coalitions to seek rent at the expense of a 
minority. This section first examines the coalitions that are likely to 
form when the game is played once and then analyzes why these  
 
 
 8. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 209–62. 
 9. See Lynn A. Stout, Strict Scrutiny and Social Choice: An Economic Inquiry into 
Fundamental Rights and Suspect Classifications, 80 GEO. L.J. 1787 (1992). 
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coalitions are likely to be stable over time when the game is played 
repeatedly. 
The results are intuitively simple. When the game is played once, 
standard game theory predicts that a minimum winning coalition will 
form and vote to distribute the entire pot among its members. In the 
three-player game, for example, Players 1 and 2 could form a coali-
tion and agree to split the pot equally between them. When the 
game is repeated, a minimum winning coalition formed in one round 
might at first glance seem unstable, because the excluded players can 
induce one of the coalition’s members to defect by offering her more 
of the pot than she receives under the existing arrangement. How-
ever, a player can maximize her long-run payout by joining a stable 
winning coalition and refusing any offer to defect, no matter how at-
tractive the short-term benefit. Thus, we might expect players to play 
a “discriminatory” strategy when the game is repeated, forming a 
stable majority coalition that wins all of the pot at the expense of a 
stable minority. 
1. Coalitions when the game is played once 
When Players 1, 2, and 3 play the divide-the-dollar game, we ex-
pect them to form a voting coalition10 of some sort to vote on an al-
location of the dollar among them. If the game is played once, stan-
dard game theory and a number of psychological studies show that 
two players are likely to form a minimum winning coalition, that is, 
the smallest coalition with the power to approve an allocation of the 
dollar (i.e., the smallest possible majority).11 In the three-player case, 
two players are likely to form a coalition and vote to distribute all or 
most of the dollar between themselves, leaving the third player with 
little or nothing. For example, Players 1 and 2 could form a coalition 
and vote for the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0).12 A minimum winning 
 
 10. A coalition is a group of players that coordinate their actions so as to bring about an 
outcome more beneficial to themselves than the outcome if the players do not coordinate. 
ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 258. 
 11. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52; see Steven G. Cole et al., Coali-
tion Preference as a Function of Expected Values in a Tetradic Weighted-Majority Game, 16 
BASIC & APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 109 (1995); J. Keith Murnighan et al., Theories of Coalition 
Formation and the Effects of Reference Groups, 13 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 166 
(1977); Jonathan Segal, Coalition Formation in Tetrads: A Critical Test of Four Theories, 103 J. 
PSYCHOL. 209 (1979). 
 12. An allocation of the dollar among the three players is represented by a vector (x1, x2, 
x3), where xi represents the portion of the dollar allocated to player i. Thus, the allocation (½, 
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coalition seems particularly likely because it gives its members a 
higher average payout than a larger coalition. For example, assume 
that the players are considering forming the grand coalition and di-
viding the dollar equally among themselves, yielding the payout 
allocation (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). Players 1 and 2 together jointly could 
make themselves better off by forming the coalition {1, 2} and 
dividing the dollar between themselves, giving Player 3 zero. 
However, any two-player coalition appears to be, in a certain 
sense, unstable. For example, suppose that Players 1 and 2 have pro-
posed splitting the dollar equally between them, resulting in the 
payout allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0). Player 3 can make a better offer to 
either Player 1 or Player 2. For example, he could propose the alloca-
tion (2/3, 0, 1/3), and Player 1 would have an incentive to accept 
it. In that case, however, Player 2 could disrupt a potential coalition 
by making a further offer that is more attractive to Player 1 or Player 
3. For example, he could propose (0, 1/2, 1/2) to Player 3. It is not 
easy to see where this cycle will end, although some coalition must 
ultimately carry the day if any player is to receive a payout. 
Game theorists have developed several solution concepts that at-
tempt to formalize our intuitions about the types of coalitions and 
resulting payout allocations that are likely to occur. The most impor-
tant for our purpose is the main-simple stable set. For the purpose of 
the three-person divide-the-dollar game, the main-simple stable set is 
the set of allocations under which a minimum winning coalition 
splits the pot equally among its members—that is, the set V = {(1/2, 
1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2), ( 0, 1/2, 1/2)}. Political theorists have 
viewed this as the set of allocations most likely to result when the di-
vide-the-dollar game is played once, and some have gone so far as to 
call it the “solution” to the game.13 The reasoning behind this is 
three-fold. First, a minimum winning coalition is particularly likely to 
form because it maximizes the joint outcome of its members. Sec-
ond, an allocation outside of V is unlikely to form because some ma-
jority coalition will always prefer an outcome in V. Finally, an alloca-
tion in V is likely to be stable because the coalition that supports it 
 
½, 0) represents an outcome in which Players 1 and 2 split the dollar equally and Player 3 re-
ceives zero. 
 13. See, e.g., BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52; cf. ORDESHOOK, supra 
note 7, at 290–98 (comparing other solution concepts). Empirical studies of related coopera-
tive games show that players tend to form minimum winning coalitions more frequently than 
larger coalitions. See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
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has no better alternative within V. The stable set is defined in more 
detail in Appendix A. 
2. Coalitions when the game is repeated 
At first glance, a coalition formed when the divide-the-dollar 
game is played once might seem to be unstable when the game is re-
peated. For example, suppose that in the first round of the game 
Players 1 and 2 formed a coalition and voted for the allocation (1/2, 
1/2, 0). When the game is played again, Player 3 can make a more 
attractive offer to Player 1. For example, he can offer to vote for the 
allocation (2/3, 0, 1/3). But then Player 2 can in turn make a better 
offer to Player 3, for example (0, 1/3, 2/3). And so on. So our first 
instinct might be that if the game is played more than once a differ-
ent coalition will form each time it is played. Over time, each player 
will be part of a winning coalition a “fair” amount of the time (the 
amount depending on the player’s power and the size of the game). 
However, players’ long-term interests may lead to coalitions be-
ing more stable than we would otherwise expect. For example, sup-
pose that the first time the game is played, Players 1 and 2 form a 
coalition and agree to divide the dollar (1/3, 1/3, 0). If the players 
do not maintain this coalition and instead play an opportunistic 
strategy by taking the best offer they can get each round, we would 
expect that over time each player would get about one-third of the 
dollar. Since all of the players are equal—each has one vote and no 
bargaining leverage that other players lack—we would expect each 
player to end up in a winning coalition an equal share of the time, 
and thus end up with a more or less equal share of the pot. Suppose, 
however, that Players 1 and 2 can come to some sort of tacit agree-
ment that they will remain in their coalition and vote for the alloca-
tion (1/2, 1/2, 0) every round, ignoring any counteroffer, no mat-
ter how attractive, from Player 3. In the long run, Players 1 and 2 
will each end up with half of the pot, which is more than the one-
third that they could expect by playing an opportunistic strategy. In 
essence, Players 1 and 2 are getting a higher payout for themselves 
by discriminating against Player 3. 
The players’ decision whether or not to maintain an existing coa-
lition is similar to the decision in a prisoner’s dilemma.14 Assume that 
 
 14. The prisoner’s dilemma is a famous scenario in game theory used to illustrate situa-
tions in which people’s pursuit of their individual interests results in the worst possible joint 
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Player 1 and Player 2 have proposed forming a coalition and dividing 
the dollar equally between them, resulting in the allocation (1/2, 
1/2, 0). Suppose further that this proposal acts as a focal point in 
the sense that Player 1 and Player 2, when determining how to pro-
ceed, consider only whether to remain in the proposed coalition or 
to negotiate secretly with Player 3 for a better deal. For the sake of 
simplicity, we will assume that Player 3, who is excluded from the 
proposed coalition, is willing to offer a deal to either Player 1 or 
Player 2 in which Player 3 receives one-third and the other player re-
ceives two-thirds. If both Player 1 and Player 2 try to negotiate with 
Player 3, Player 3 has an equal probability of forming a coalition with 
either. If only one tries to negotiate, Player 3 has a 100% probability 
of forming a coalition with that player. 
The resulting two-player noncooperative game is as follows: 
 
                  Player 2 
 
        Stay                       Defect 
Stay (1/2, 1/2, 0) (0, 2/3, 1/3) 
Player 1 
Defect (2/3, 0, 1/3) (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)15 
 
outcome. The scenario involves a criminal prosecutor who is conducting independent interro-
gations of two criminal suspects. The prosecutor can prove that the prisoners committed a mi-
nor offense but requires a confession from one of them to prove that they committed a major 
one. So he proposes the following deal: If neither prisoner confesses, each will be charged with 
the minor offense and serve one year in prison. If one confesses and the other does not, the 
confessor will be set free, but the other will be convicted of the major offense and serve the 
maximum sentence of ten years. If both confess, each will be convicted of the major offense 
but will serve a reduced penalty of eight years. Each prisoner, considering only his own self-
interest, has an incentive to confess, regardless of what his counterpart does. However, this 
results in a worse outcome for both prisoners than if neither confesses. See ROGER B. 
MYERSON, GAME THEORY: ANALYSIS OF CONFLICT 97 (1991). 
 15. If both Players 1 and 2 attempt to negotiate secretly with Player 3, each has a fifty 
percent chance of forming a coalition and receiving two-thirds and a fifty percent chance of 
being excluded from the winning coalition and receiving zero. Therefore, each has an expected 
payout of one-third. 
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This game is a form of the prisoner’s dilemma. If unable to co-
ordinate, Players 1 and 2 each have an incentive to defect and nego-
tiate secretly with Player 3. If they can coordinate, they maximize 
their joint expectation by remaining in the proposed coalition. 
Therefore, we might expect that if the game is repeated, both a “co-
operative” strategy (maintaining the existing coalition) and a “com-
petitive” strategy (defecting in light of a better offer) will be equilib-
ria of the repeated game.16 Since the cooperative strategy maximizes 
the payouts of Players 1 and 2, we can expect that they will have 
some incentive to play this strategy, particularly if they can coordi-
nate. 
This result can be described more formally by imposing a bar-
gaining structure on the repeated divide-the-dollar game—a coop-
erative game—and transforming it into a repeated noncooperative 
game. The players can then be treated as independent of each other, 
forming coalitions through a negotiation process in which each 
player acts in his or her own self-interest. We can “solve” the re-
peated divide-the-dollar game under the hypothetical bargaining 
structure. The main result for the purpose of this article is that, as-
suming the players do not discount future payouts too much and 
there are not too many players, a “discriminatory” strategy in which 
players attempt to form and maintain a stable minimum winning 
coalition is an equilibrium strategy of the repeated divide-the-dollar 
game. A more detailed description and proof of this result are pro-
vided in Appendix B. 
Coalition-formation costs may act to make an equilibrium strat-
egy even more stable. For example, suppose that in the three-person, 
divide-the-dollar game Players 1 and 2 are currently in a coalition 
together, and each has the option of negotiating a coalition with 
Player 3. If negotiation with Player 3 imposes costs on the players—
which would reduce the value of the new coalition—Players 1 and 2 
will have an additional incentive (beyond the strategic interests dis-
cussed above) to remain in the existing coalition. In fact, negotiation 
 
 16. When the prisoner’s dilemma is played once, we expect self-interested players to play 
a competitive strategy because they gain by doing so, regardless of the action of their oppo-
nent. When the game is played repeatedly, however, cooperative strategies become feasible 
because a player’s defection in one round may induce his opponent to defect in subsequent 
rounds. See ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 173–80. See generally ROBERT AXELROD, THE 
EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1984). 
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with Player 3 might lead to offers and counteroffers among all of the 
various players, leading to an extended negotiation that would con-
sume much of the value of whatever coalition ends up forming. This 
“downward spiral” once negotiations are opened up may act as a 
strong incentive to play a stable strategy, rather than an opportunis-
tic strategy.17 
3. Discrimination as a focal point in a repeated game 
The above discussion indicates that creating some stable majority 
coalition is likely to be an equilibrium strategy in the repeated di-
vide-the-dollar game. However, the players have a choice of many 
other equilibria as well. First, they have a wide variety of majority 
coalitions from which to choose. Second, they may choose not to 
form a stable coalition at all, instead playing something akin to an 
“opportunistic” strategy, renegotiating coalitions as necessary to 
maximize their short-term payout. Determining which of the above 
strategy profiles are equilibria does not necessarily tell us which equi-
librium is likely to form. 
When a game has more than one equilibrium strategy, certain 
equilibria may be more likely to occur in practice than others. A fa-
mous example is the coordination game in which two players know 
they must meet each other in New York City on a specific day but 
are otherwise unable to communicate. Each must pick a time and 
place and hope that the other player shows up. This game has an in-
finite number of equilibria, in which both players show up at the 
same time and same location in New York City. Nonetheless, when 
people were asked about their choice of strategy (the time and place 
at which they would try to meet), over half selected Grand Central 
Station as the place, and nearly all selected noon as the time.18 Par-
ticipants picked this place and time not simply because it appeared 
salient to them, but more importantly, because they expected it to be 
salient to the person they were supposed to meet. An equilibrium 
that players are particularly likely to adopt because of its mutual sali-
ence is called a focal point.19 
 
 17. See Roger D. Congleton & Robert D. Tollison, The Stability Inducing Propensities of 
Very Unstable Coalitions: Avoiding the Downward Spiral of Majoritarian Rent-Seeking, 15 
EUR. J. POL. ECON. 193 (1999). 
 18. THOMAS C. SCHELLING, THE STRATEGY OF CONFLICT 54–56 (1960). 
 19. Id. at 54–57. 
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Like the meeting-in-New-York game, the repeated divide-the-
dollar game has multiple equilibria. In the three-player game, the 
players have an incentive to form a two-person majority coalition. 
However, if all players are identical and no coalition existed before-
hand, we have no apparent way to predict what coalition will form. 
Suppose, however, that the players have already played one round, 
and in the first round Player 1 and Player 2 formed a coalition. This 
coalition, because it has already formed once, is likely to be more sa-
lient than the other two possible coalitions, and, thus, we might ex-
pect Player 1 and Player 2 to form the same coalition again.20 
Similarly, suppose that no coalition existed before this round of 
the game, but assume instead that Players 1 and 2 share some char-
acteristic that distinguishes them from Player 3. For example, sup-
pose Players 1 and 2 speak English and Player 3 speaks French. This 
shared trait might provide a way of distinguishing the coalition {1, 2} 
from the coalitions {1, 3} and {2, 3}, and thus make the coalition be-
tween Players 1 and 2 particularly likely to form. As before, the coali-
tion {1, 2} is likely to be a focal point in the coalition-formation 
game. 
A coalition formed around a trait may become salient because it 
is particularly easy to form and maintain over time. For example, coa-
litions formed around a trait that divides people into two separate 
groups with little gray area in between them might be particularly 
easy to maintain because of the lack of a need to bargain over where 
to draw the line between the majority and the minority. Also, coali-
tion-formation costs may increase with a coalition’s size. Public 
choice theorists have long recognized that a small, well-organized 
group finds it much easier to create and maintain a stable coalition 
than a large, diffuse group.21 Players’ demonstrated preference for a 
minimum winning coalition, rather than a larger coalition, may be 
due in part to the higher costs incurred in obtaining the agreement 
of additional players, as well as the cost of policing the coalition to 
prevent defection.22 
A particular shared trait may act as a focal point in a game even 
 
 20. See Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 
1649, 1702 (2000) (explaining that in a repeated game, an equilibrium played in one round 
may act as a focal point for subsequent rounds). 
 21. Bruce A. Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713, 724–26 
(1985). 
 22. Id. 
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though it is entirely arbitrary and bears no relationship to any mean-
ingful characteristics of the players. For example, studies have been 
performed in which students are placed into one of two categories 
ostensibly based on preference for certain artistic styles. When these 
students were asked to allocate payouts to members of their own 
“group”—those with the same artistic preferences—and members of 
the other group, they consistently allocated more to members of 
their own group.23 This result occurred even when students were 
visibly divided into groups based on no more than the flip of a 
coin.24 Arbitrary division into groups can affect coalition formation 
in bargaining games, as players have been found to prefer coalitions 
with members of their own group.25 
All of this suggests that a coalition based around a shared trait 
may become a focal point strategy for one of two reasons. First, that 
coalition may simply be a coalition that already exists or that has 
been used in the past for rent-seeking purposes. Second, the coali-
tion may provide a low-cost or salient way of distinguishing some 
players from other players. The import of this observation for Equal 
Protection doctrine will be discussed in more detail below, but it is 
worth noting that it may describe why a trait like race or gender may 
operate as a focal point for coalition formation in a rent-seeking 
game. First, these traits provide a natural and low-cost way to distin-
guish the players in the majority from the players in the minority be-
cause they are obvious and because—at least as they have been socie-
tally constructed—they divide society more or less into separate 
groups. Second, the history of discrimination based on these traits 
indicates that they have been used in the past for coalition building. 
Preexisting coalitions based on these traits may function as focal 
points simply because they already exist. 
While the game-theoretic model applies principally to discrimina-
tion at the group level (discrimination in the political process), ana-
lyzing discrimination based on race and gender as a focal point in a 
coalitional game may also help explain why discrimination occurs in 
other contexts. When a game is played repeatedly, a focal point strat-
egy that is adopted by the players may, over time, become internal-
 
 23. HENRI TAJFEL, HUMAN GROUPS AND SOCIAL CATEGORIES 268–72 (1981). 
 24. Id. 
 25. James Martinez, The Effect of Social Categorization on Coalition Formation (1985) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan) (on file with the Stanford Law 
School Library). 
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ized by the players as a social norm.26 Once a social norm has been 
adopted, players receive utility in the form of reputational benefits by 
complying with the norm. That is, they comply with the norm in or-
der to receive esteem from other members of their social group. 
Thus, for example, once a social norm has been established that fa-
vors racial discrimination, people might comply with this norm, even 
when it does not directly provide them with a strategic advantage in 
a game, but simply because other members of their social group ex-
pect them to comply with it. The benefit that people gain from this 
type of discrimination may take the form of increased intragroup 
status27 or a reputation for being faithful to the existing coalitional 
structure and willing to cooperate with other members of the major-
ity.28 
B. Discrimination by Individuals 
While the above model is intended to explain discrimination by 
groups against other groups, it may yield some insights into why in-
dividuals discriminate against other individuals. Many rent-seeking 
situations within society are likely to involve small groups of indi-
viduals, rather than the entire population. For example, a society-
wide social norm favoring discrimination along racial lines might be 
used in a situation involving a single industry or a single employer. 
That is, individuals within a larger coalition can be responsible for 
individual acts of discrimination.29 Individuals within a larger major-
ity coalition have an incentive to discriminate along established lines. 
This can be illustrated using a simple example. We assume that 
rent-seeking situations in our society occur in situations involving 
small subsets of the society as a whole. For simplicity, we will assume 
that each situation involves exactly three players, selected randomly.30 
 
 26. Much recent literature has analyzed social norms as focal points in coordination 
games, although most involves noncooperative games (like the prisoner’s dilemma) rather than 
cooperative games. See, e.g., ERIC A. POSNER, LAW AND SOCIAL NORMS (2000); Cristina Bic-
chieri, Norms of Cooperation, 100 ETHICS 838 (1990); Robert Cooter, Expressive Law and 
Economics, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 585 (1998); McAdams, supra note 20. 
 27. See Richard H. McAdams, Cooperation and Conflict: The Economics of Group Status 
Production and Race Discrimination, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1003, 1023–29 (1995). 
 28. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 133–47. 
 29. David H. Swinton, A Labor Force Competition Model of Racial Discrimination in the 
Labor Market, 9 REV. BLACK POL. ECON. 5, 21 (1978), reprinted in 1 ECONOMICS AND 
DISCRIMINATION 334 (W. Farity, Jr. ed., 1995). 
 30. This is akin to George Akerlof’s model of discrimination in random encounters be-
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Rent-seeking situations might involve, for example, competition for 
a scarce job or access to a public good, like education. Assume that 
our society is divided into two groups: a majority, denoted with a  , 





Now suppose that the members of the majority have two possi-
ble strategies. They can play opportunistically, trying to get the best 
deal for themselves regardless of the makeup of the participants of 
the game, or they can play a coordinated strategy in which they agree 
to form a coalition among their own members whenever possible. If 
they play opportunistically, they will end up with around one-third 
of the total rent on the average, since their strategy treats all players 
equally. If all players use a discriminatory strategy, the payouts in the 
three situations including at least one member of the majority will be 
something like the following: 
(   ) = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) 
(  ) = (1/2, 1/2, 0 ) 
( ) = (0, 1/2, 1/2) 
If we assume that the society contains m members of the major-
ity and n members of the minority, the odds that an individual player 
will be in a group with another member of the majority and one 
member of the minority (  ) will be proportional to mn. The 
odds that he will be in a group with two members of the minority 
( ) is proportional to n2/2. It is simple to calculate that, as long 
as the members of the majority constitute a majority (i.e., m > n), 
they are better off, as a whole, playing a discrimination strategy 
rather than an opportunistic strategy. 
Within an individual game, however, a member of the majority 
may have an incentive to defect from the coordinated strategy in or-
der to maximize his own payout. Suppose that a member of the ma-
jority (call him i) in a group with one member of the minority 
(  ) would be able to secure a better deal by bargaining with the 
member of the minority. For example, assume that i could secure the 
payout allocation (2/3, 0, 1/3). The majority can dissuade this type 
 
tween agents. George A. Akerlof, Discriminatory, Status-based Wages Among Tradition-
Oriented, Stochastically Trading Coconut Producers, 93 J. POL. ECON. 265 (1985). 
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of defection using a simple punishment strategy. If i defects, the next 
time he is in a group consisting of three members of the majority 
(   ), the other two majority members will cut him out, treating 
him as though he were a member of the minority, and he will get a 
payout of zero rather than one-third. In this case, i gains one-sixth 
when he is in a group with one other member of the majority and 
loses one-third when he is in a group with two other members of the 
majority. Since the odds of i being in group (   ) are propor-
tional to m2/2, and the odds of being in group (  ) are propor-
tional to mn, the ostracism strategy will dissuade defection in this ex-
ample as long as m > n. These types of punishment strategies have 
been used in real-world examples as detailed in Part II.D, below. 
C. Testing the Model: Stability of Coalitions in Empirical Studies 
In contrast to the vast literature on both repeated noncoopera-
tive games31 and single-play cooperative games,32 very little empirical 
work has studied the stability of coalitions in repeated cooperative 
games. The few studies that exist, however, demonstrate that players 
in these games have a long-term incentive to form and maintain sta-
ble coalitions, although a competing incentive exists to maximize 
short-term gains. 
A short series of studies in the 1960s and 1970s attempted to 
measure the stability of coalitions over time in a three-person bar-
gaining game.33 In the first study, each of the three potential mini-
mum winning coalitions—{1, 2}, {1, 3}, and {2, 3}—was assigned a 
payout. The grand coalition {1, 2, 3} was not assigned a payout and 
was, presumably, prohibited. Eight groups of three played this game 
forty times in succession. Of the eight groups, five appear to have 
played something akin to a stable strategy, with the winning coali-
 
 31. The seminal work in this area is AXELROD, supra note 16. For a sampling of the 
hundreds of articles analyzing and applying the repeated prisoner’s dilemma, see Robert Ax-
elrod & Lisa D’Ambrosio, Annotated Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation (1994), 
available at http://www.pscs.umich.edu/RESEARCH/Evol_of_Coop_Bibliography.html. 
 32. See, e.g., Cole et al., supra note 11; H. Andrew Michener & Daniel J. Myers, An 
Empirical Comparison of Probabilistic Coalition Structure Theories in 3-person Sidepayment 
Games, 45 THEORY & DECISION 37 (1998); Segal, supra note 11. 
 33. See Bernhardt Lieberman, Coalitions and Conflict Resolution, 18 AM. BEHAV. 
SCIENTIST 557 (1975) [hereinafter Lieberman II]; Bernhardt Lieberman, i-Trust: A Notion of 
Trust in Three-person Games and International Affairs, 8 J. CONFLICT RESOL. 271 (1964) 
[hereinafter Lieberman I]. The payouts for the three potential coalitions differed, making this 
game slightly different from the divide-the-dollar game discussed in this article. 
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tion changing fewer than ten times. In three of these groups, the 
winning coalition changed only twice.34 The remaining three groups 
appear to have played a form of opportunistic strategy, with the win-
ning coalition changing at least twenty times.35 In a subsequent 
study, a total of twenty-five groups of three played a similar game, 
but in addition to receiving a payment each round, the members of a 
coalition that remained stable through all forty trials received a bo-
nus payment. With this modification, a majority of groups unsurpris-
ingly formed a stable winning coalition that lasted through all forty 
trials.36 Of the remaining groups, three appear to have had only one 
change in the winning coalition.37 
A separate study by Keith Murnighan explored the reasons for 
defection from a stable coalition in a repeated five-person bargaining 
game.38 In this experiment, forty groups of five played a total of 155 
games, each consisting of twelve trials. In almost one-quarter of the 
games, a single winning coalition remained stable through all twelve 
trials. In the remaining games, a total of 131 stable coalitions—
winning coalitions lasting three or more rounds—formed.39 When a 
defection occurred, post-defection and long-run payouts were less 
than pre-defection payouts for all members of the stable coalition, 
including both defectors and nondefectors.40 In this sense, as 
Murnighan notes, the game was similar to a repeated prisoner’s di-
lemma.41 
Anecdotes from these studies demonstrate that players recog-
nized the long-term value of a stable coalition. In the Murnighan 
study, students described their expectation that other coalition 
 
 34. Lieberman I, supra note 33, at 276. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Lieberman II, supra note 33, at 573. 
 37. Id. Two important aspects of these studies may have affected the stability of coali-
tions over time. First, all of the studies repeated a game a finite number of times. During the 
last few rounds of the game, end-game factors may have given the players an incentive to de-
fect from an existing coalition because the long-term advantage of remaining in a stable coali-
tion would have disappeared. Second, like the model in this paper, Lieberman’s studies in-
volved only three players; thus, the costs of renegotiating a coalition were likely to be low. 
 38. J. Keith Murnighan, Defectors, Vulnerability, and Relative Power: Some Causes and 
Effects of Leaving a Stable Coalition, 34 HUM. REL. 589 (1981). The players in Murnighan’s 
study had varying numbers of votes (they were not equally powerful) because his study was 
intended to measure the effect of power differences on willingness to defect. 
 39. Id. at 601. 
 40. Id. at 606. 
 41. Id. at 607. 
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members would continue to be loyal, which increased their own loy-
alty to an existing coalition.42 In the Lieberman study, players 
evinced trust of their current coalition partners and recognized the 
potential long-term effects of defection: “I must trust [Player] 1 and 
he can trust me. If I leave him, you’ll wonder if I might leave you. 
Then if you two team up, I’ll have nowhere to turn.”43 This indicates 
that players were thinking along the lines described in the discussion 
of the three-person divide-the-dollar game, above. 
D. Testing the Model: Discrimination for  
the Purpose of Rent Seeking 
The history of race and gender discrimination in both the United 
States and other countries provides many examples of discrimination 
for the purpose of rent seeking. These situations can be modeled as a 
cooperative game with coalitions being formed on the basis of race 
or gender.44 This section describes three historical examples of dis-
crimination for rent-seeking purposes: (1) racial discrimination in the 
Jim Crow South; (2) racial discrimination in the labor market; and 
(3) discrimination against women in the labor market. 
1. Rent seeking in the Jim Crow South 
The Jim Crow South provides numerous examples of rent seek-
ing on the basis of race. Laws and practices that acted to benefit the 
white majority at the expense of the black minority fall broadly into 
two groups. First, a system of labor laws acted to reduce the wages of 
agricultural laborers. Second, segregation laws enabled whites to ob-
tain more and better public goods than blacks.45 
 
 42. Id. at 608. 
 43. Lieberman I, supra note 33, at 278. 
 44. Jennifer Roback, Racism as Rent Seeking, 27 ECON. INQUIRY 661, 671–72, 675–79 
(1989) [hereinafter Roback II]. 
 45. Segregation laws have been analyzed under an associational preference theory. 
However, analyzing them as rent seeking eliminates the need to assume an exogenous “taste” 
for discrimination because it recognizes that a majority may derive direct economic benefit 
from discriminatory laws. As W.H. Hutt noted with respect to South African apartheid, 
  We do not, however, find in colour prejudice as such the main origin—nor, 
perhaps, even the most important cause—of most economic colour bars. The chief 
source of colour discrimination is, I suggest, to be found in the natural determina-
tion to defend economic privilege (the preservation of “customary economic rela-
tionships between the races”), non-Whites simply happening to be the essentially 
underprivileged groups in South Africa. 
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The first group of laws acted to depress the wages of black agri-
cultural workers by creating what was essentially a cartel of white 
employers. These laws included enticement and contract-
enforcement laws, which made it difficult for laborers to switch em-
ployers; vagrancy laws; emigrant-agent laws; and the convict-lease 
system.46 Enticement laws made it illegal for an employer to “entice” 
a worker who had a contract with a different employer.47 Contract-
enforcement laws criminalized a laborer’s breach of an employment 
contract. Emigrant-agent laws made it illegal to entice workers to 
leave a city or state and take employment elsewhere.48 All of these 
laws were intended to reduce competition for farm labor, thereby re-
ducing wages.49 Vagrancy laws, which outlawed behavior like “‘wan-
dering or strolling about in idleness,’”50 effectively made it a crime to 
be out of work. 
The punishment for crimes like vagrancy and contract-breach it-
self served as a form of rent seeking. Convicted vagrants were typi-
cally put on chain gangs and forced to work on local public-works 
projects.51 Many Southern states employed a convict-lease system 
under which convicts could be leased by the state or county to pri-
vate firms.52 This served not only as a means for the state and private 
planters to obtain low-cost labor, but also created a strong enforce-
ment mechanism for laws that effectively forced laborers to work for 
submarket wages. 
In addition to laws giving whites an advantage in the labor mar-
ket, a separate set of laws gave whites increased access to local public 
goods, like hospitals, libraries, parks, and schools. Beginning with 
statutes requiring separate train compartments for blacks and whites, 
Southern states and cities enacted a network of ordinances and regu-
lations that segregated virtually every form of public facility.53 While 
 
W.H. HUTT, THE ECONOMICS OF THE COLOUR BAR 27 (1964). 
 46. Jennifer Roback, Southern Labor Law in the Jim Crow Era: Exploitative or Competi-
tive?, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 1161, 1163–64 (1984) [hereinafter Roback I]. 
 47. Id. at 1164. 
 48. Id. at 1169. 
 49. Id. at 1164. 
 50. Id. at 1168 (quoting 1903 Ala. Acts 224). 
 51. Id. at 1168–69. 
 52. Id. at 1170. 
 53. C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW 97–100 (2d rev. ed. 
1966); see GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND 
MODERN DEMOCRACY 334–36 (1944). 
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the laws facially specified “separate but equal” facilities, in reality the 
practice was much different. Many recreational facilities, built and 
maintained with public funds, were closed entirely to blacks.54 Only a 
fraction of public libraries in the South served blacks.55 Even when 
separate facilities existed for blacks, they were of much lower quality 
than those available to whites. Streets in primarily black areas of cities 
were not maintained as well as those in white areas.56 The best gov-
ernment jobs went mostly to whites.57 
Discrimination in the provision of public goods was particularly 
obvious in the case of education. Schools were segregated through 
the South. Per-pupil spending for black students was often a fraction 
of that for white students.58 Teachers’ salaries in black schools were 
lower than those in white schools, and the student-teacher ratio was 
higher.59 Facilities at black schools were of poorer quality than those 
in white schools. Thus, education served as a form of direct rent 
seeking by reserving to whites the vast majority of public funds used 
for that purpose.60 
Discrimination in public education also acted as an indirect form 
of rent seeking by providing whites with a greater opportunity than 
blacks to develop the human capital required for the best jobs.61 Seg-
 
 54. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 346–47. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. at 335. A number of cities were at one time separated by law into all-white and 
all-black blocks. Restrictive covenants performed a similar function. WOODWARD, supra note 
53, at 100–01. 
 57. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 335. 
 58. For example, in Mississippi and Georgia, spending per white pupil was five times 
greater than spending per black pupil. Id. at 339. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Myrdal notes that spending differentials between black and white students were 
greatest in counties with large black populations, hypothesizing that those counties had a 
greater incentive to seek rent through public education: 
State appropriations for educational purposes are usually apportioned on a per capita 
basis. Counties with a high proportion of Negro children, consequently, have a big-
ger opportunity than have other counties to deprive Negro schools of money in-
tended for them and to use it for white schools. For, in such counties there is more 
money to “rob” from the Negroes, and the temptation to do it, therefore, must be 
particularly great. 
Id. at 341 (footnote omitted). See also Roback II, supra note 44, at 678 (“[C]ounties with 
relatively large black populations[] distributed the money allocated for black children to the 
white schools. . . . Thus, white schools in black belt counties were the best funded schools in 
the South.”). 
 61. Roback II, supra note 44, at 667–68. 
2ROY.DOC 3/23/02  10:18 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
74 
regation of other types of facilities may also have served an indirect 
rent-seeking function by reducing contact between racial groups, 
thus denying blacks networking opportunities available to whites.62 
The Jim Crow system was supported by a “punishment strategy” 
that discouraged defection by individual members of the majority. 
This strategy was similar to the ostracism strategy described above, in 
which a defecting member of the majority is treated as a member of 
the minority. Social custom permitted whites to disregard rules of 
segregation by, for example, using facilities designated for blacks.63 
However, whites who routinely disregarded discriminatory customs 
effectively “los[t] caste” and were subject to sanctions, including 
threats, intimidation, and open violence, normally reserved to mem-
bers of the minority.64 
2. Rent seeking in the labor market based on race 
In addition to the openly discriminatory laws in the Jim Crow 
South, a separate set of policies operated in the early 1900s to pro-
tect skilled, high-paying, or high-status jobs for white workers. At 
about the same time that the Jim Crow system arose in the South, a 
policy of Jim Crow unionism arose, and many labor unions began to 
organize themselves openly around race. In 1900, the American 
Federation of Labor (AFL), which up to that point had been offi-
cially race-neutral, amended its constitution to allow charters to be 
issued to racially segregated unions.65 A number of AFL affiliates had 
official policies barring blacks from membership, while others used 
practices that had the same effect, like stringent skill requirements, 
high initiation fees, or refusal to honor travel cards of black work-
 
 62. For example, as the Supreme Court has noted with respect to segregation in law 
schools: 
The law school, the proving ground for legal learning and practice, cannot be effec-
tive in isolation from the individuals and institutions with which the law inter-
acts. . . . The law school to which Texas is willing to admit petitioner excludes from 
its student body members of the racial groups which number 85% of the population 
of the State and include most of the lawyers, witnesses, jurors, judges and other offi-
cials with whom petitioner will inevitably be dealing when he becomes a member of 
the Texas Bar. 
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 634 (1950). 
 63. MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 575–76. 
 64. Id. at 576. 
 65. PHILIP S. FONER, ORGANIZED LABOR AND THE BLACK WORKER 1619–1981, at 
72–73 (Int’l Publishers 2d ed. 1981) (1974). 
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ers.66 Employers followed suit, excluding black workers from indus-
tries, particularly skilled industries, in which an adequate supply of 
white labor existed.67 As a result, black workers were excluded from 
many of the most desirable jobs.68 
Race relations during this period show an element of coalitional 
bargaining. After Reconstruction, rural whites perceived blacks as 
competition for increasingly scarce positions as tenants and share-
croppers.69 The Southern aristocracy encouraged racial tensions in 
order to prevent political cooperation between poor blacks and poor 
whites. In fact, prior to 1890, the black vote in the South generally 
aligned with the white aristocracy.70 As the nation industrialized, 
white-dominated labor unions played a role in protecting desirable 
jobs for white workers. In order to prevent a labor coalition between 
white and black workers, employers themselves discriminated in hir-
ing, favoring white workers where they were available. The joint 
support of white workers and white employers for discriminatory 
norms can be seen as a coalition between those groups to seek rent 
in the labor market at the expense of black workers. 
Race relations in the labor market have explicitly been modeled 
as a three-player game among employers, majority workers, and mi-
nority workers.71 Each player has some bargaining leverage: The em-
ployer has control over hiring and wages and can give a preference to 
a certain subset of the labor force in hiring for the best jobs. Each set 
of workers can engage in cost-raising tactics, like a strike, slowdown, 
boycott, etc.72 If the two groups of workers cooperate with one an-
other, they gain bargaining power because their cost-raising tactics 
 
 66. Id. at 73–74. 
 67. WILLIAM JULIUS WILSON, THE DECLINING SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE: BLACKS AND 
CHANGING AMERICAN INSTITUTIONS 67 (2d ed. 1980); see also MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 
294. 
 68. See MYRDAL, supra note 53, at 280–96; WILSON, supra note 67, at 73–74. 
 69. WILSON, supra note 67, at 54. 
 70. Id. at 55. 
 71. See Swinton, supra note 29; see also DONALD TOMASKOVIC-DEVEY, GENDER & 
RACIAL INEQUALITY AT WORK: THE SOURCES & CONSEQUENCES OF JOB SEGREGATION 62 
(1993) (“[E]mployers can be understood to be forming coalitions with white male workers to 
exclude women and minorities from desirable jobs.”); Ray Marshall, The Economics of Racial 
Discrimination: A Survey, 12 J. ECON. LITERATURE 849 (1974) (analyzing racial discrimina-
tion in employment using a bargaining model with actors including employers, white workers, 
black workers, unions, and the government). 
 72. Swinton, supra note 29, at 26–27. 
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will be more effective.73 Under this model the employer might 
choose to form a tacit coalition with majority workers, agreeing to 
restrict high-status, high-paying jobs to members of the majority in 
exchange for lower average wages, in order to prevent a labor coali-
tion between black and white workers.74 The employer chooses the 
majority workers as a bargaining partner because their cost-raising 
tactics are more effective than those of the minority. 75 
3. Rent seeking based on gender 
Discrimination on the grounds of both race and gender has been 
analyzed using this type of model. In the 1800s and early 1900s, 
many male-dominated unions tried to protect male workers in skilled 
jobs from competition from females. Protection took the form of 
hour restrictions, prohibitions on working out of the home, and 
prohibition of women from certain types of jobs.76 For example, laws 
in the United States at various times prohibited women from practic-
ing law77 or tending bar.78 Unions frequently excluded women, ei-
ther barring them from membership entirely or restricting the posi-
tions that they could hold.79 
Heidi Hartmann cites the cigar-making industry as a prominent 
example.80 In 1860, over 90% of workers in the cigar industry were 
male. In 1869, a wooden cigar mold was introduced, and women 
began to be employed in their homes, making cigars using the 
 
 73. Id.; see also MATS LUNDAHL & ESKIL WADENSJÖ, UNEQUAL TREATMENT: A 
STUDY IN THE NEO-CLASSICAL THEORY OF DISCRIMINATION 50 (1984) (explaining neo-
Marxist theory). 
 74. Swinton, supra note 29, at 29. 
 75. The labor market can also be viewed as a cooperative game among employees only, 
treating the employer as exogenous to the game. Some Marxist theorists have argued that a 
nonhomogeneous labor force offers a natural focal point for low-cost coalition formation 
within the labor force. In this case, self-interested workers can maximize their individual out-
comes by forming the smallest possible coalition that can construct an effective threat to the 
employer. Bruce Talbot Coram, Spoiling the Class Divide: Struggles Within the Working Class 
over Distribution, 43 BRIT. J. SOC. 393 (1992). 
 76. See generally SYLVIA WALBY, PATRIARCHY AT WORK: PATRIARCHAL AND 
CAPITALIST RELATIONS IN EMPLOYMENT 90–155 (1986); Heidi Hartmann, Capitalism, Pa-
triarchy, and Job Segregation by Sex, in WOMEN AND THE WORKPLACE 137, 147–69 (Martha 
Blaxall & Barbara Reagan eds., 1976). 
 77. See Bradwell v. State, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1873). 
 78. Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948). 
 79. Hartmann, supra note 76, at 164. 
 80. Id. at 162. 
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molds. In response, the Cigarmakers International Union, which was 
male-dominated, successfully sought laws banning home work and 
also argued for a restriction on the number of hours women could 
work.81 
Courts initially upheld laws discriminating against women on the 
ground that women needed to be protected. In the early case Brad-
well v. State, the Supreme Court upheld a law prohibiting women 
from practicing law.82 In Muller v. Oregon, for example, the Supreme 
Court upheld maximum hours laws for women, saying: 
The two sexes differ in structure of body, . . . in the capacity for 
long-continued labor, particularly when done standing, the influ-
ence of vigorous health upon the future well-being of the race, the 
self-reliance which enables one to assert full rights, and in the ca-
pacity to maintain the struggle for subsistence. This difference justi-
fies a difference in legislation and upholds that which is designed to 
compensate for some of the burdens which rest upon her. 83 
The openly given rationale for these laws was the protection of 
male jobs. Proponents of these laws argued that men, as breadwin-
ners for the home, required a higher wage than women, whose in-
come was normally supplemental to that of men.84 
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR EQUAL PROTECTION 
To summarize the discussion up to this point, a simple game-
theoretic model shows that people may have an incentive to dis-
criminate in order to seek rent for themselves at the expense of a 
long-term minority. People or groups are likely to form long-term 
rent-seeking coalitions along the lines of traits that allow stable coali-
tions to be formed and maintained, and used to seek rent, at low 
cost. Once formed, a coalition structure acts as a focal point in future  
 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Bradwell, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130. The concurrence by Justice Bradley opined: 
[T]he civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in 
the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or should be, 
woman’s protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity and delicacy 
which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of 
civil life. 
Id. at 141 (Bradley, J., concurring). 
 83. 208 U.S. 412, 422–23 (1908). 
 84. See WALBY, supra note 76, at 148–50; Hartmann, supra note 76, at 158–59. 
2ROY.DOC 3/23/02  10:18 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
78 
rent-seeking situations and can become internalized as a social norm 
favoring discrimination. 
This model provides a means for analyzing Equal Protection 
doctrine using the political process approach of Carolene Products. 
This section begins with an overview of related theories of Equal 
Protection, including process-oriented theories and economic theo-
ries of discrimination. It then describes the implications of the game-
theoretic model for Equal Protection doctrine, focusing particularly 
on the definition of a suspect classification and on the role of Equal 
Protection law in remedying discrimination. 
A. Existing Theories of Equal Protection and Discrimination 
Theories of Equal Protection fall broadly into two categories: 
antidifferentiation theories, which focus on the rights of individuals, 
and antisubordination or political-process theories, which focus on 
the status of groups and the process by which certain groups become 
subordinated.85 The Carolene Products approach ties naturally to an 
antisubordination theory because it focuses on a group’s lack of 
power in the political process. 
While the model in this article posits an economic explanation 
for discrimination—or at least one that uses economic analytical 
tools—it differs from most existing economic explanations for dis-
crimination. Most economic theories of discrimination do not tie 
naturally to Equal Protection law because they do not explain why 
certain types of traits (like immutable traits) are particularly likely to 
be the basis of discrimination or why a particular group can be 
persistently disadvantaged in the political process. This section gives 
an overview of existing process-oriented theories of Equal Protection 
and economic theories of discrimination and then describes the ad-
vantages of a game-theoretic approach. 
1. Process theories of Equal Protection 
Process-oriented theories, following the Carolene Products ap-
proach, have described Equal Protection doctrine as remedying de-
fects in the political process that can result in the subordination of a 
minority. John Hart Ely, in Democracy and Distrust, accepts that the 
 
 85. Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1005 (1986). 
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democratic system “does not ensure . . . the effective protection of 
minorities whose interests differ from the interests of most of the rest 
of us.”86 If representatives rely on the support of a majority coalition 
to be reelected, they have an incentive to pass laws favoring the ma-
jority coalition and ignoring the minority that they do not need. 
This creates a representation-enforcing role for the judiciary. Under 
Ely’s theory, the judiciary may review laws that classify people based 
on race and “racelike” characteristics in a way that might be moti-
vated by stereotypes.87 In particular, when most representatives pos-
sess a particular trait, there is a danger that they will engage in “we-
they” generalization, “seizing upon the positive myths about [their] 
own class and the negative myths about” the other, and assuming 
“that not many of ‘them’ will be unfairly deprived, nor many of ‘us’ 
unfairly benefitted, by the proposed classification.”88 
Ely has difficulty, however, determining which traits should give 
rise to suspect scrutiny. While maintaining that suspect classifications 
must be “racelike,” he concedes that existing theory does not define 
this concept.89 Ely runs through a number of alternatives. Consider-
ing immutability, he notes that the list of truly immutable traits is 
very small, and that even those do not all give rise to suspect scrutiny 
under current doctrine (intelligence and physical disability, for ex-
ample, do not).90 Similarly, while the Supreme Court has suggested 
that distinctions perceived as “a stigma of inferiority and a badge of 
opprobrium”91 should be deemed suspect, it has not described the 
level of stigma necessary for a class to be suspect or why certain 
classes that historically have been stigmatized—like homosexuals and 
the disabled—have not been protected. Ultimately Ely falls back on 
the notion of “we-they” stereotyping, the idea that distinctions are 
likely to be for an improper purpose when they work to the benefit 
of those in power.92 
More recently, Bruce Ackerman has attacked the use of “discrete 
 
 86. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 78 
(1980). 
 87. Id. at 158. 
 88. John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE 
L.J. 920, 933–34 n.85 (1973). 
 89. ELY, supra note 86, at 149. 
 90. Id. at 150. 
 91. Jimenez v. Weinbeger, 417 U.S. 628, 631 (1974). 
 92. ELY, supra note 86, at 158–59. 
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and insular minority” as the touchstone for a higher level of scru-
tiny.93 According to standard public choice theory, he argues, small, 
identifiable groups can organize themselves easily and, therefore, 
have more political power relative to their size than a large, diffuse 
group does. As an example, particular industries are frequently able 
to enact protective tariffs that are beneficial to their groups but 
harmful to society at large.94 Accordingly, he concludes, discreteness 
and insularity are red herrings. A group’s protected status should de-
rive not from the fact that the group is small and easy to identify, but 
rather from the existence of prejudice against that group.95 
2. Economic theories of discrimination 
Most existing economic models of discrimination do not tie 
naturally to an antisubordination approach to Equal Protection. The 
two prevailing neoclassical theories, the associational preferences, or 
“taste” theory,96 and models based on statistical discrimination,97 fo-
cus on discrimination by individuals, rather than discrimination at 
the group level. Moreover, these theories, particularly those that as-
sume a preexisting taste to avoid association with certain groups, fo-
 
 93. Ackerman, supra note 21, at 713. 
 94. Id. at 728. 
 95. Id. at 731. 
 96. The associational preferences theory, first proposed by Gary Becker, hypothesizes a 
“taste” for discrimination that is present in varying amounts in different people. A person with 
a taste for discrimination against a certain group will pay, or forfeit income, in order to avoid 
contact with the disfavored group. The taste for discrimination imposes a cost on transactions 
between members of different groups, which is treated in the same way as other types of costs. 
For example, suppose that an employer has a taste for discrimination against a certain group, 
and, therefore, when hiring a member of that group acts as though it incurs a cost beyond that 
person’s wages. That additional cost, which Becker refers to as a “discrimination coefficient,” is 
a measure of the degree of the employer’s aversion to association with the disfavored group. 
See generally GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION (2d ed. 1971); 
RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 651–53 (4th ed. 1992). 
 97. A model based on statistical discrimination proposes that membership in a racial or 
other group is used as a surrogate for the possession of undesirable qualities that members of 
that group are believed to have. For example, a firm with incomplete information about work-
ers’ productivity might use race, gender, or some other trait as a surrogate for likely productiv-
ity when hiring workers. If the firm believes that members of a particular race are less produc-
tive, and the cost of determining a worker’s productivity ex-post is sufficiently high, the firm 
may discriminate against members of that race based on its belief. In the case of so-called racial 
profiling, police who believe that members of a certain race are likely to commit crimes may 
discriminate against members of that race. See, e.g., LUNDAHL & WADENSJÖ, supra note 73, at 
41–46; Kenneth J. Arrow, The Theory of Discrimination, in DISCRIMINATION IN LABOR 
MARKETS 3 (Orley Ashenfelter & Albert Rees eds., 1973). 
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cus on the effects, rather than the causes, of discrimination. Most 
importantly, they do not explain why discrimination is particularly 
likely to be based on certain types of traits, like race and gender, and 
therefore provide little guidance in the area of suspect classification 
doctrine. 
More recently, Richard McAdams has proposed an economic 
model based on status-seeking, arguing that discrimination is a 
method of increasing a group’s status relative to another group.98 
McAdams notes that individuals have a taste for status derived both 
from membership within a certain group (intergroup status) and 
from the esteem in which they are held by other members of that 
group (intragroup status).99 Discrimination arises when one social 
group attempts to increase its own status by portraying members of 
an out-group as inferior. Discriminatory social norms, under this 
theory, prevent members of the high-status group from free riding 
on each other’s investment in the status of their group. Individuals 
who comply with discriminatory norms are held in higher esteem by 
other members of the in-group, thereby increasing their intragroup, 
as well as intergroup, status.100 
McAdams’s theory is more useful for policymakers than models 
based on associational preferences or statistical discrimination be-
cause it describes both why discrimination arises and why it persists. 
In fact, as will be described in more detail, a status-seeking theory is 
structurally similar to the rent-seeking model described in this arti-
cle.101 However, it fails to answer two questions addressed by the 
rent-seeking model. First, by ignoring the use of discrimination for 
rent-seeking purposes, it does not describe how one group becomes 
“high-status” and the other becomes “low-status.” In fact, people 
derive status from membership within a group in a very wide variety 
of circumstances—for example, groups based in national heritage, 
 
 98. McAdams, supra note 27. 
 99. Id. at 1019. 
 100. Id. at 1023–30. 
 101. Other commentators have proposed models of discrimination with similarities to the 
game-theoretic model presented here. David Swinton has analyzed racial discrimination in la-
bor markets as a simple three-player (noncooperative) game involving employers, white em-
ployees, and minority employees. Swinton, supra note 29. Jennifer Roback has proposed a 
rent-seeking model of discrimination involving “psychic rents” resulting from a taste for dis-
crimination as well as traditional economic rents. Roback II, supra note 44. More recently, 
Eric Posner has analyzed discrimination against an out-group as a means of signaling willing-
ness to cooperate with members of the in-group. E. POSNER, supra note 26. 
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profession, alma mater, etc. The existence of a group does not neces-
sarily cause everyone who is not a member of the group to believe he 
is low-status. For example, I derive status from being a resident of 
San Francisco and may believe that San Franciscans are better, more 
cultured, etc., than, say, Los Angelenos, but Los Angelenos do not 
therefore believe they are low-status. Status seeking becomes a prob-
lem when it is combined with rent seeking by one of the groups 
and/or an attempt to form economic or political coalitions at the 
expense of the other group. The out-group becomes “low-status” in 
large part because it receives a smaller share of the economic pie than 
the in-group. 
Second, McAdams’s theory does not, by itself, explain why cer-
tain traits—race and gender, for example—are used for status-seeking 
so frequently. In fact, on its face, McAdams’s theory applies only to 
race. In order to determine whether traits other than race should 
form the basis for suspect classifications, it is useful to understand 
why certain types of traits are used as the basis for subordination. 
The rent-seeking model described in this paper addresses this issue as 
a function of the cost of building and maintaining stable coalitions 
and using them for rent-seeking purposes.102 
3. Relationship of the game-theoretic model to other theories of 
discrimination 
The rent-seeking model implies a slightly different approach 
from those of Ely103 and Ackerman.104 As under Ely’s approach, “we-
they” distinctions are an important part of the rent-seeking model. 
Members of the majority coalition (“we”) make distinctions that 
benefit them at the expense of the minority (“they”). Thus, stereo-
typical generalizations about members of the out-group are likely to 
be those that support legislation protecting advantages enjoyed by 
the in-group. For example, a stereotype that women are not consti-
tutionally equipped to engage in certain occupations reduces compe-
tition for those jobs and protects the male workers who currently oc-
 
 102. With those caveats in place, McAdams’s theory is similar to that presented in this 
article. In fact, the game-theoretic model presented here can be applied to any zero-sum bar-
gaining game, so it applies to a status-seeking situation to the extent status is zero-sum—that 
is, to the extent increased status for an in-group comes at the expense of the status of the out-
group. 
 103. See supra notes 86–92 and accompanying text. 
 104. See supra notes 93–95 and accompanying text. 
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cupy them. However, the rent-seeking model can provide some 
guidance, which Ely does not, as to what it means for a trait to be 
“racelike” in the sense that it is used for subordination. The qualities 
that make a trait racelike are discussed in more detail in Part III.B.1, 
below. 
A coalitional model acts as a partial rebuttal to Ackerman’s public 
choice theory argument. Under ordinary circumstances, small, well-
defined interest groups can bargain with other groups and end up in 
a winning coalition a fair percentage of the time. However, when a 
trait provides an easy way to distinguish a stable majority from a sta-
ble minority, the minority, even if well-defined, may find its attempts 
to play the democratic bargaining game blocked by the majority. 
Under these circumstances, a discrete and insular minority can be 
subject to long-term subordination. 
The game-theoretic model presented in this paper is fundamen-
tally different from a model based on taste or on statistical discrimi-
nation. Unlike Becker’s theory, this model assumes no preexisting 
taste for avoiding association with members of a particular group. In-
stead, it assumes that discrimination arises and is perpetuated because 
it benefits, or appears to benefit, those in the majority. Once coali-
tions form around a certain trait, discrimination based on that trait 
becomes a social norm. An apparent “taste for discrimination” be-
yond one that benefits the majority can be explained either as a taste 
for compliance with an existing social norm105 or as a psychological 
consequence of the formation of an in-group and an out-group. 
The game-theoretic model is also different from a model based 
on statistical discrimination. Under this model, a trait need not be 
associated with any other undesirable qualities, and in fact, discrimi-
nation can arise even if members of the majority and minority are re-
garded as equally productive. Differences in productivity may arise 
when rent seeking occurs if, for example, the minority is restricted 
from opportunities to build human capital through education. As 
discussed in more detail below, stereotypes about productivity may 
function as rationalizations for rent-seeking legislation. For example, 
stereotypes about women’s ability to perform certain types of jobs 
may be a means of protecting from competition the men who hold  
 
 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
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those jobs.106 Stereotypes may also be a psychological consequence of 
the formation of an in-group and out-group.107 
Other economic models of discrimination are similar to the 
game-theoretic model presented here. McAdams’s status-seeking 
model, for example, can be incorporated into a rent-seeking model 
because status is a form of “psychic rent.”108 To the extent status is 
zero-sum—that is, status for the majority is gained at the expense of 
the status of the minority—the cooperative game outlined in Part II 
applies to status seeking as well as ordinary rent seeking.109 
More recently, Eric Posner has modeled discrimination as a 
means of signaling willingness to cooperate in a repeated game.110 
That is, a member of the majority discriminates against a minority in 
order to signal willingness to cooperate with other members of the 
majority. Under Posner’s theory, people complying with a social 
norm favoring discrimination receive a benefit in the form of 
stronger cooperative relationships with desired cooperative part-
ners.111 While Posner analyzes discrimination as a noncooperative 
game, in which people act individually rather than as a group, his 
model has some of the same implications as a coalitional approach. If 
a majority coalition seeks rent at the expense of a minority, discrimi-
nation might signal a willingness to cooperate with the majority 
rather than defecting and accepting a potentially better offer from 
the minority. Furthermore, because the existing structure can be 
supported by a “punishment” strategy that punishes members of the 
majority that cooperate with members of the minority, people might 
 
 106. See supra Part II.D.3. Stereotypes may also simply be a psychological outgrowth of 
the creation of an in-group and out-group. See generally TAJFEL, supra note 23. 
 107. See TAJFEL, supra note 23, at 143–61. 
 108. See Roback II, supra note 44, at 673–75; see also McAdams, supra note 27, at 1019–
20. 
 109. McAdams himself suggests that status seeking is a zero-sum game and expressly 
analogizes it to rent-seeking behavior: 
[R]acial status preferences inherently conflict. Race discrimination exists because 
members of (at least) one race seek for their group a status position that is incom-
patible with the position sought by members of one or more other groups. Even 
when only one group seeks superiority, if the other group seeks equality, the strug-
gle for social status is zero sum. Consequently, the appropriation of status by subordi-
nating behavior is, like theft, a mere wealth transfer; the gain to the discriminator is at 
least matched by the loss to the victim. 
McAdams, supra note 27, at 1075–76 (emphasis added). 
 110. E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 133–47. 
 111. Id. at 133–34. 
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discriminate in order to avoid punishment. 112 In this case, discrimi-
nation acts as a signal of compliance with the existing equilibrium.113 
B. Suspect Classifications Under a Rent-Seeking Model 
Current Equal Protection doctrine operates by identifying classi-
fications along certain lines (like race) as suspect114 and subjecting 
them to a higher degree of scrutiny than classifications based on 
other traits. This raises a natural question—what traits other than 
race invoke heightened scrutiny? A rent-seeking model suggests that 
some classifications can have the effect of subordinating a particular 
group by creating a stable majority coalition. At the same time, some 
degree of rent seeking is inevitable in a democracy and is not consti-
tutionally problematic. This section argues that one purpose of sus-
pect-classification jurisprudence is to identify traits that are particu-
larly likely to be used for subordination—that is, traits likely to be 
used as a focal point in forming a stable rent-seeking coalition. 
The Supreme Court has not articulated a single test for deter-
mining whether a trait gives rise to a suspect classification. A group’s 
status as a discrete and insular minority within the meaning of 
Carolene Products is just one of several criteria that the Court has 
weighed when analyzing suspect classifications in various contexts. 
First, it examines whether a class is a discrete and insular minority 
“relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to com-
mand extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political proc-
ess.”115 Second, it considers whether a class possesses “‘an immutable 
 
 112. See supra Part II.B; E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 138–39 (noting that members of 
the in-group “often avoid, shun, or even attack” those who cooperate with members of the 
out-group). 
 113. Radical theorists have proposed another economic model of discrimination that is 
akin to a game-theoretic model. For example, Michael Reich has proposed that racial antago-
nism between white workers and black workers benefits, and is promoted by, employers. Un-
der this model, employers discriminate in order to prevent a coalition between white and black 
workers. See generally MICHAEL REICH, RACIAL INEQUALITY: A POLITICAL-ECONOMIC 
ANALYSIS (1981); cf. David Swinton, supra note 29 (analyzing the labor market as a bargain-
ing game involving employer, white employees, and black employees).  
 114. The Supreme Court has identified both “suspect” classes, which give rise to strict 
scrutiny, and a separate set of “quasi-suspect” classes, which give rise to an intermediate level 
of scrutiny. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 325 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing) (referring to women and illegitimates as “quasi-suspect” classes). For the purpose of the 
following discussion, I do not distinguish between suspect and quasi-suspect classifications. 
 115. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973). 
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characteristic determined solely by the accident of birth.’”116 Third, it 
determines whether the class has been subjected to a “‘history of 
purposeful unequal treatment.’”117 Finally, it considers whether the 
trait used to define the class “frequently bears no relation to ability 
to perform or contribute to society.”118 
These criteria make sense if discrimination is analyzed as a form 
of long-term coalitional rent seeking. As will be described in more 
detail, it is difficult to form stable coalitions around a mutable trait 
because the composition of the majority and minority coalitions 
would change over time. Because of the strategic incentive to form 
long-term coalitions where possible, a minority coalition can be rele-
gated to a “position of political powerlessness,”119 and this lack of 
power can give rise to the need for judicial intervention. Finally, a 
history of purposeful unequal treatment can show that a trait is being 
used as a focal point in a rent-seeking game. Thus, the majority of 
the Court’s criteria for determining when a trait gives rise to a sus-
pect class ties naturally to a rent-seeking model.120 
The following Part proposes an approach to determining 
whether a certain group is a “discrete and insular minority” within 
the sense of being easy to exclude from coalitions with other groups. 
It argues that a trait’s likely use as a focal point for coalition forma-
tion should be a central part of the determination of whether that 
trait should be deemed a suspect classification and identifies several 
factors that bear on this inquiry. I do not argue that all of these fac-
tors must be met for a classification to be suspect; not even race 
 
 116. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see Johnson v. Robison, 415 
U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974). 
 117. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 83 (2000) (quoting Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 
at 28). 
 118. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 440–41 (1985) 
(quoting Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686). 
 119. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28. 
 120. The final criterion, the relevance of the trait to the purported purpose of the law 
making the classification, does not relate directly to a rent-seeking model except to the obvious 
extent that rent seeking can create an incentive to classify based on a trait that is irrelevant to 
any other purpose. Under a rent-seeking model, the relevance criterion may relate not to 
whether a trait is a good candidate for rent seeking—and, thus, should invoke a higher level of 
scrutiny—but rather to the particular level of scrutiny the court uses. For example, both race 
and gender have historically been used as basis for rent seeking. Gender classifications are given 
intermediate scrutiny, rather than strict scrutiny, because gender is deemed to be more often 
relevant to legitimate government purposes. See, e.g., Michael M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 
464 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). 
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clearly satisfies all of them. Instead, they provide a means of deter-
mining a group’s likely ability to form coalitions with other groups, 
and they also provide a way to tie this inquiry to other criteria, like a 
trait’s immutability, that courts have used to determine whether a 
trait is suspect.121 
 
1. Qualities of a trait likely to be used to form stable rent-seeking 
coalitions 
A trait is likely to be used for long-term rent seeking if it sup-
ports the creation of stable coalitions. It should lend itself to low-
cost formation and maintenance of a majority coalition. It should 
provide a bright line between members and nonmembers and be sta-
ble over time. That is, it should be difficult for members of the mi-
nority coalition to enter the majority coalition and vice versa. Finally, 
the coalition should be one that can feasibly be used for rent-seeking 
purposes. For example, it should be easy to determine whether a per-
son is a member of the majority or minority. These criteria suggest 
that a trait used for rent seeking—call it a “suspect trait”—is likely to 
have most of the following characteristics. First, the trait should be 
immutable in the sense that the memberships of the majority and 
minority should be subject to little change over time. Second, it 
should be evident whether a person is a member of the majority or 
minority. Third, the trait should be discrete in that it divides society 
into two or more separate groups rather than defining a continuum. 
Fourth, the size of the minority group created by the trait must be 
large enough that it makes it worthwhile for the majority to seek rent 
from it. And finally, a history of discrimination based on that trait 
might make that trait more salient and thus more likely to serve as a 
focal point for future coalition building. 
a. Immutable. Courts have long accepted that an immutable trait 
is particularly likely to be used for invidious discrimination. Under a 
rent-seeking model, an immutable trait is likely to be used to form a 
stable coalition for two reasons. First, members of the majority are 
 
 121. I also am not advocating that only laws that actually seek rent from a minority be 
subject to strict scrutiny. Many laws that classify people may—even if they do not themselves 
seek rent directly—support a system of subordination that benefits a majority at the expense of 
a minority. For example, laws that segregate members of different groups do not necessarily 
seek rent on their face but act in the long run to diminish a minority’s educational, career, and 
political opportunities. See generally Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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unlikely to become members of the subordinated group. As Lynn 
Stout points out, “While a white male of English descent born into 
wedlock in the United States may become poor, old, or handi-
capped, there is no chance he will become black, female, Greek, ille-
gitimate, or an alien.” 122 Thus, discrimination on the basis of race 
seems more likely than, for example, discrimination against the eld-
erly because everyone (assuming he lives long enough) will one day 
be a member of the group subject to discrimination based on age.123 
Second, members of the minority are unlikely to become mem-
bers of the majority. Indeed, discrimination on the basis of a freely 
mutable trait would simply cause people to change that trait.124 Even 
if a trait were not freely mutable, limited mutability would, over 
time, dilute the rent available to the majority as members of the mi-
nority enter the majority coalition. Thus, long-term subordination of 
attorneys, for example, would be difficult because eventually no one 
would choose to become an attorney. 
Traits may have several levels of immutability. First, a trait may 
be completely immutable in the sense that no member of the major-
ity coalition can ever become a member of the minority and vice 
versa. Race and, for practical purposes, gender are examples of this. 
Because these traits give rise to extremely stable in-groups and out-
groups, they are obvious candidates for the type of rent seeking de-
scribed in this article. Second, a trait may be inward-immutable, 
meaning that no member of the out-group can become a member of 
the in-group. Discrimination against the elderly or disabled are ex-
amples of discrimination based on inward-immutable traits. Finally, a 
trait may be outward-immutable, meaning that no member of the in-
group can become a member of the out-group. Youth and alienage 
are examples of outward-immutable traits. Traits that are completely 
immutable would seem like more natural candidates for rent seeking 
than traits that are immutable in only one direction. Traits that are 
immutable in neither direction are less likely to be used for rent seek-
ing. 
Some traits that are not truly immutable in any of these senses 
 
 122. Stout, supra note 9, at 1817; see also Roback II, supra note 44, at 675. 
 123. See Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1976) (“[E]ven old age 
does not define a ‘discrete and insular’ group in need of ‘extraordinary protection from the 
majoritarian political process.’ Instead, it marks a stage that each of us will reach if we live out 
our normal span.” (citation omitted)). 
 124. E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 134. 
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may have some degree of immutability because they are difficult to 
change in practice due to societal barriers or because they are impor-
tant to a person’s identity. For example, poverty is not immutable in 
a strict sense, but socioeconomic forces may make it difficult for the 
poor to break out of the cycle of poverty. Religion and sexual orien-
tation may be difficult to change because they are so important to a 
person’s identity.125 A trait that is mutable only at a cost could be 
used as the basis for rent seeking to a limited extent. If the cost of 
changing a trait is sufficiently high—higher than the difference be-
tween the rent accruing to a member of the minority and a member 
of the majority—a member of the minority will not have sufficient 
incentive to alter that trait and will remain the subject of rent seek-
ing. 
Finally, a trait that is not inherently immutable can be made 
functionally immutable by imposing legal barriers on change. For ex-
ample, social class is not inherently immutable, but a legal regime 
like hereditary nobility or a strict caste system can operate to make it 
so. Similarly, wealth is not immutable, but a legal regime can make it 
difficult to change by, for example, restricting access to human capi-
tal through education. By adopting legal rules that stabilize traits 
that are the basis for coalition formation, a majority coalition can in-
crease its stability. 
b. Evident. A trait is easier to use for coalition formation if it is 
evident, that is, if it is easy to determine who has the trait and who 
does not. An evident trait makes it easy to determine who is a mem-
ber of the in-group and who is a member of the out-group, allowing 
coalition formation at low cost. An evident trait also may tend to 
provide a psychological focal point for coalition formation, making a 
coalition based on that trait more stable.126 An evident trait is easy to 
use for rent seeking because it is easy to determine who to favor and 
who to disfavor. For example, employment discrimination based on 
race is easier than employment discrimination based on legitimacy 
because a job candidate’s race is evident and his legitimacy or ille-
gitimacy is not. Finally, an evident trait might make a punishment 
strategy more effective because it makes it easy to see when a mem-
 
 125. See Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (homosexuality), 
vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 (1989) (en banc). Discrimination based on 
these types of traits could be analyzed under the fundamental rights branch of Equal Protec-
tion analysis even if these traits do not give rise to suspect classifications. 
 126. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 135; Roback II, supra note 44, at 676. 
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ber of the majority defects and cooperates with a member of the mi-
nority. 
For these reasons, courts have recognized that a trait’s ob-
servability may make it more likely to be used for invidious discrimi-
nation. For example, in Frontiero v. Richardson, the Supreme Court 
held that classifications based on gender, like those based on race, 
are inherently suspect, in part because of gender’s obviousness: “[I]t 
can hardly be doubted that, in part because of the high visibility of 
the sex characteristic, women still face pervasive . . . discrimination in 
our educational institutions, in the job market and . . . in the politi-
cal arena.”127 
Like immutability, a trait’s evidence can be manipulated through 
law. Historically, members of a majority have occasionally tried to 
make unobservable traits evident in order to accord reduced status to 
people with those traits. For example, in Nazi Germany prisoners 
were marked with colored triangles corresponding to the reasons for 
their incarceration. A green triangle marked its wearer as a regular 
criminal, and a red triangle denoted a political prisoner. Jewish pris-
oners were marked with two overlapping yellow triangles forming a 
star of David, and homosexuals were marked with a pink triangle. 
Homosexuals bearing a pink triangle were assigned to the most diffi-
cult labor.128 Similarly, while wealth is not inherently observable, in 
the past, law and/or social custom dictated the clothing and behav-
ior of different classes of society, making them readily identifiable.129 
c. Discrete. A trait is a good candidate for coalition formation if it 
divides society into separate groups, rather than forming a contin-
uum. There are two reasons for this. First, discreteness eliminates the 
 
 127. 411 U.S. 677, 686 (1973); see also Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986) (ex-
amining whether class composed of parent, children, and siblings “exhibit[s] obvious, immu-
table, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group”). 
 128. Erwin J. Haeberle, Swastika, Pink Triangle, and Yellow Star: The Destruction of Sex-
ology and the Persecution of Homosexuals in Nazi Germany, in HIDDEN FROM HISTORY: 
RECLAIMING THE GAY & LESBIAN PAST 365, 376 (Martin Bauml Duberman et al. eds., 
1989). 
 129. For example, sumptuary laws in medieval and renaissance Europe reserved certain 
types of clothing materials, like silk, ermine, and pearls, to certain classes of nobility. In nine-
teenth-century Turkey, different ethnic and religious groups were required to wear different 
styles of hat: Greeks wore dark caps; Armenians, balloon-shaped headdresses; Jews wore brim-
less caps; and Turks, a red fez. Even stricter laws existed in Japan, regulating in detail the dress 
and behavior of people at all levels of society. Elizabeth B. Hurlock, Sumptuary Law, in 
DRESS, ADORNMENT, AND THE SOCIAL ORDER 295–301 (Mary Ellen Roach & Joanne Bu-
bolz Eicher eds., 1965). 
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need to negotiate where the line should be drawn between the in-
group and out-group, making coalition formation more straightfor-
ward and, presumably, less costly. Second, like an evident trait, a dis-
crete trait allows easy determination of who is a member of the in-
group and who is in the out-group, making it easier to discriminate 
based on that trait.130 
Gender, alienage, and illegitimacy are examples of discrete traits. 
Disability, on the other hand, is not discrete because a wide range of 
types and degrees of disability exist. Race is not a discrete trait be-
cause many people—Tiger Woods being a notable example—are a 
mixture of different ethnicities in various proportions. However, law 
and custom have functioned historically to keep race discrete. For 
example, the “one-drop rule” in the United States essentially re-
duced the spectrum of mixtures of European and African-American 
ethnicities into two categories: white and non-white.131 Laws ban-
ning interracial marriage served a similar purpose. 132 Even today, 
controversy rages about how to categorize people of mixed race, 
with many arguing for a limited number of categories.133 
d. Group size. The size of a minority group may bear on its likely 
use as a focal point for rent seeking. First, a group is unlikely to be 
the subject of subordination if it has a majority of political power. 
While a group with the majority of power may be the subject of 
some rent seeking—by a small, well-organized lobby, for example—
it can flex its political muscle if a political minority tries to deprive it 
of significant benefits. As described above, however, a group can be a 
numerical majority and still lack the majority of power in the sense of 
ability to affect political outcomes. For example, a numerical minor-
ity within a jurisdiction could control the majority of the wealth—
and thus form a majority of the tax base, spend more money on ad-
vertising and lobbying, etc.—and, therefore, have more power than 
simple numbers would indicate. 
Second, a trait is likely to be used for long-term rent seeking if 
 
 130. Eric Posner has noted this phenomenon in relation to a signaling model of discrimi-
nation. See E. POSNER, supra note 26, at 136. 
 131. Lawrence Wright, One Drop of Blood, THE NEW YORKER, July 24, 1994, at *3, 
available at http://www.afn.org/~dks/race/wright.html. 
 132. See Janet E. Halley, The Politics of the Closet: Towards Equal Protection for Gay, Les-
bian, and Bisexual Identity, 36 UCLA L. REV. 915 (1989) (discussing miscegenation laws). 
 133. See Nathaniel Persily, Color by Numbers: Race, Redistricting, and the 2000 Census, 
85 MINN. L. REV. 899 (2001). 
2ROY.DOC 3/23/02  10:18 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
92 
the minority coalition it creates is large enough that the rent that can 
be extracted from it is larger—or at least not significantly smaller—
than the amount of rent that can be gained by forming coalitions 
around different traits. This is akin to the observation that an optimal 
strategy in the divide-the-dollar game is to form a minimum winning 
coalition so that the maximal amount of rent can be extracted and 
distributed to the smallest possible majority. For example, as noted 
above, discrimination in the allocation of school funds in the Jim 
Crow South was particularly severe in the counties with the largest 
minority population.134 On the other hand, institutionalized rent 
seeking against a very small minority—people more than seven feet 
tall, for example—is unlikely because the percentage of people in the 
minority coalition would be so small that the cost of forming and 
maintaining coalitions around this trait would be greater than the 
amount of rent that could be obtained.135 
e. History of discrimination. Finally, since the equilibrium strategy 
that players will choose depends on the coalitional structure that ex-
ists at the beginning of a game, a history of discrimination based on 
a certain trait can make that trait more likely to be used for rent seek-
ing. As described above, a prior division of people into groups—even 
a completely arbitrary one—can affect subsequent decisions about 
preferred coalition partners. Members of an identifiable group tend 
to prefer forming coalitions with other members of that group and 
distributing resources to members of that group.136 If, for example, 
race has been used in the past as a means of categorizing people, it is 
more likely to serve as a natural focal point for coalition formation in 
the future. Because race, ethnicity, and gender have long been used 
as means of distinguishing people from one another, these traits are 
likely to serve as natural focal points. 137 
 
 134. See supra notes 44–60 and accompanying text. 
 135. A minority of significant size may also suffer a higher degree of discrimination be-
cause it is seen as greater competition for scarce resources—like jobs—than a small minority. 
See HUBERT M. BLALOCK, TOWARD A THEORY OF MINORITY-GROUP RELATIONS 143–73 
(1967). 
 136. See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text. 
 137. Other factors may bear on the likelihood of a trait being used as a focal point for 
coalition formation. For example, the proximity of members of the majority and minority to 
one another may also have an effect on coalition formation. People may be more likely to enter 
into coalitions with people with whom they have regular contact, like family, friends, and geo-
graphic community. Similarly, to the extent rent seeking is intergenerational, a trait that is in-
herited might tend to support coalitions that are stable from generation to generation. 
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2. Application to selected traits other than race and gender 
a. Alienage. Alienage has been recognized as a suspect classifica-
tion,138 although the Court has applied strict scrutiny more deferen-
tially in cases involving aliens than in those involving race.139 
Alienage seems like a good candidate for formation of rent-seeking 
coalitions. Alienage is inward-immutable because a citizen is ex-
tremely unlikely to become an alien. Alienage is outward-mutable 
only with the consent of the state, so the majority coalition can con-
trol the extent to which aliens join the majority by becoming citi-
zens. Alienage is discrete because a person either is or is not a U.S. 
citizen. Although alienage is not inherently evident, citizens of other 
countries can sometimes be identified by language or ethnicity. Fur-
thermore, proof of citizenship is required for jobs, so alienage is 
made evident in the labor market, a principal arena for rent seeking. 
Finally, aliens have no vote, making them especially vulnerable to po-
litical rent seeking. 
Furthermore, alienage has been used historically, and is used to-
day, for rent seeking. Under current law, aliens can be prohibited 
from certain types of jobs140 and are ineligible for certain government 
benefits.141 Undocumented aliens are routinely hired to work long 
hours for subminimum wages.142 In certain cases they have been held 
in virtual slavery, held on an employer’s premises, subjected to physi-
cal abuse, and threatened with serious harm if they leave their jobs.143 
b. Illegitimacy. Illegitimacy has also been recognized as a quasi-
suspect classification giving rise to an intermediate level of scru-
 
 138. Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). 
 139. E.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978) (holding that state may bar employ-
ment of aliens as state troopers); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) (finding that Congress 
may impose conditions on alien’s participation in Medicare). 
 140. See Foley, 435 U.S. 291. 
 141. See Mathews, 426 U.S. 67. 
 142. See, e.g., Hidden in the Home: Abuse of Domestic Workers with Special Visas in the 
United States, 13 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH No. 2(G) (June 2001), available at 
http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/usadom/usadom0501.pdf [hereinafter Hidden in the 
Home]; U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Inspection Report: Immigration and Naturalization Service Ef-
forts to Combat Harboring and Employing Illegal Aliens in Sweatshops, Rep. Num. I-96-08 
(May 1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oig/i9608/i9608toc.htm; U.S. Dep’t of 
State, International Information Programs: Motivation of Chinese Illegal Aliens, available at 
http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/chinaaliens/why.htm. 
 143. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice, supra note 142, at *3; Hidden in the Home, supra note 
142, at 19–22. 
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tiny.144 However, unlike alienage, illegitimacy does not seem like a 
good candidate for rent seeking. Legitimacy is immutable, because it 
is determined by accident of birth, and is discrete. However, it is not 
evident, so it is unlikely to serve as a focal point for coalition building 
and is also difficult to use as a means of seeking rents. For example, 
an employer ordinarily has no way to determine whether an applicant 
was born in wedlock. Finally, while nonmarital children have been 
the subjects of rent seeking—for example, some states have prohib-
ited them from inheriting by intestate succession145—they have not 
been the persistent targets of discrimination in the same way as 
women and racial minorities. 
c. Religion. The Supreme Court has not held religion to be a 
suspect classification, although lower courts have occasionally as-
sumed in dicta that it is one.146 On its face, religion does not appear 
to be a likely candidate for rent seeking. Religion is mutable at will, 
although changing religion may involve very high costs since religion 
is often central to a person’s identity. Religion is not evident. It may 
be discrete to the extent most people are not members of more than 
one religion, although religious beliefs can exist in various degrees 
among members of a given religion. Therefore, religion does not 
look like an obvious candidate for coalition formation. 
Yet religion plainly has been used for this purpose throughout 
history, and religious minorities have been the subject of rent seek-
ing. Why has religion been used in this way? Several potential expla-
nations exist. First, in some cases religion may be used as a surrogate 
for other truly immutable traits, like national origin or ethnicity. For 
 
 144. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988). 
 145. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978). 
 146. See, e.g., Ball v. Massanari, 254 F.3d 817, 823 (9th Cir. 2001) (“If the statute em-
ploys a suspect class (such as race, religion, or national origin) . . . .”); Williams v. Scott, 142 
F.3d 441, No. 97-1223, 1998 U.S. App. LEXIS 6556, at *7 (7th Cir. Mar. 26, 1998) (“The 
placement of Williams in medical segregation on the basis of his religion, a suspect classifica-
tion, would require that it be analyzed under the strict scrutiny standard.”); Pinnacle Nursing 
Home v. Axelrod, 928 F.2d 1306, 1317 (2d Cir. 1991) (“Since suspect classifications such as 
race, religion, or national origin are not involved here, we apply the ‘traditional’ equal protec-
tion analysis.”); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) 
(“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes di-
rected at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities.” (citations omitted)). But see 
Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 375 n.14 (1974) (holding conscientious objectors on reli-
gious grounds not a suspect class). Courts have not been required to address whether religion 
is a suspect classification under the Equal Protection Clause because suits involving religious 
discrimination have ordinarily been brought under the Free Exercise Clause. 
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example, prejudice against Muslims may be a surrogate for prejudice 
against people of Arab ancestry. This is not true for all discrimination 
based on religion. For example, stable coalitions have formed around 
religion in Ireland even though Irish Catholics and Protestants share 
a common ethnicity. Second, although formation of coalitions 
around religion involves higher transaction costs than formation 
around, say, race, in societies that are racially homogeneous, religion 
may simply be the most efficient basis for stable, long-term rent seek-
ing. Since social groups in those societies may already form around 
religion, religion may provide an easy focal point for coalition forma-
tion. 
Finally, some discrimination based on religion may be due to fac-
tors other than rent seeking. Laws or practices that discriminate 
based on religion can occur for several reasons. Some practices, like 
public funding of parochial schools, teaching about a majority relig-
ion in public schools, or allowing public religious displays, may pro-
vide a benefit to a favored religion.147 These are akin to classic rent 
seeking. Others may be intended to discourage the practice of a mi-
nority religion—or at least have that effect—without providing a 
benefit to other religions.148 These have an entirely different func-
tion, as they simply attempt to discourage the practice of a disfavored 
religion. The latter type of discrimination does not fit within a rent-
seeking model and so is beyond the scope of this article, although it 
could be subject to heightened scrutiny under an antidiscrimination 
or individual rights analysis.149 
d. Age and disability. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,150 the 
Supreme Court reiterated its earlier holding that age is not a suspect 
classification. The Court noted explicitly that age is inward-mutable 
because all of us, assuming we live long enough, will experience old 
 
 147. See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (examining display of 
nativity scene in public courthouse); Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) (concerning 
teaching “creation science” in public schools); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (involv-
ing tax deduction for spending on parochial school). All of these cases were decided under the 
Establishment Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause. 
 148. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993) (involving law banning animal sacrifice); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990) (scrutinizing law banning use of peyote). These cases were decided under the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, rather than the Equal Protection Clause. 
 149. This is particularly easy in the case of religion, because a specific Constitutional 
guarantee makes the free exercise of religion a fundamental right. 
 150. Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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age.151 Age is evident, but is not discrete, because age forms a spec-
trum rather than dividing people into separate categories. Thus, coa-
litions formed around age are likely to be less inherently stable than 
coalitions formed around race and gender. The elderly have not suf-
fered a “history of purposeful unequal treatment” akin to discrimina-
tion based on race or gender.152 Finally, as a practical matter, the eld-
erly have not shown any difficulty forming coalitions in political 
bargaining situations. In fact, the American Association of Retired 
Persons is regarded as one of the most powerful lobbies in the 
United States.153 
Disability has been held not to be a suspect classification for simi-
lar reasons.154 Disability is inward-mutable, because any person might 
unexpectedly become disabled. Disability may be (but is not always) 
evident and is not discrete because many types and levels of disability 
exist.155 Finally, as the Supreme Court noted in City of Cleburne v. 
Cleburne Living Center, the disabled are not “politically powerless in 
the sense that they have no ability to attract the attention of the 
lawmakers.”156 
e. Homosexuality. Although the Supreme Court has not ad-
dressed the issue directly, circuit courts have held homosexuality is 
not a suspect classification.157 The extent to which homosexuality is 
immutable has been the subject of much scientific and academic de-
bate; the prevailing view being that it is immutable in some people 
but not others.158 Homosexuality is neither evident nor does it divide 
 
 151. Id. at 83; see Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
 152. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83. 
 153. See, e.g., The Power 25: Top Lobbying Groups, FORTUNE, May 2001, available at 
http://www.fortune.com/lists/power25/. 
 154. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 321 (1993); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living 
Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 441–47 (1985). 
 155. The Cleburne court noted this with respect to the mentally retarded: “Nor are they 
all cut from the same pattern: . . . they range from those whose disability is not immediately 
evident to those who must be constantly cared for.” City of Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 442. 
 156. Id. at 445. 
 157. See, e.g., Able v. United States, 155 F.3d 628, 632 (2d Cir. 1998); Richenberg v. 
Perry, 97 F.3d 256, 260–61 (8th Cir. 1996); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 928 (4th Cir. 
1996); cf. Watkins v. United States Army, 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding homo-
sexuality to be a suspect classification), vacated and aff’d on other grounds, 875 F.2d 699 
(1989) (en banc). Compare Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), with Bowers v. Hardwick, 
478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 158. See, e.g., Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of 
the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994). As noted above, however, a 
trait that is mutable only at great cost might still be used for rent-seeking purposes. 
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people into discrete groups, since hetero- and homosexuality may ex-
ist in varying degrees in different people. Homosexuality does not 
appear to be a likely basis for formation of stable rent-seeking coali-
tions. 
Why then, does discrimination based on homosexuality occur? 
Homosexuality might be analyzed in a similar way to religion, an-
other trait that is not necessarily evident, is not always immutable, 
but is important to individual identity. Discrimination based on ho-
mosexuality may have one (or both) of two causes: It may provide a 
benefit to a favored sexual orientation that is denied to homosexuals, 
or it may impose a penalty on the practice of homosexuality in order 
to discourage it. Laws barring same-sex marriage or prohibiting ho-
mosexuals from serving in the military fall into the first category. 
These laws and other laws, such as those prohibiting sodomy, fall 
into the second. However, the principal effect of even laws in the 
first category, like those prohibiting identified homosexuals from 
serving in the military, is to drive homosexual behavior under-
ground. Thus, discrimination based on homosexuality probably is 
not explained well by a rent-seeking model and might be better ana-
lyzed under an antidifferentiation theory or theory of fundamental 
rights.159 
C. Affirmative Action and “Reverse Discrimination” 
So-called “reverse discrimination” occurs when a suspect trait 
(race, for example) is used to provide benefits to the minority, rather 
than the majority. To date, the Supreme Court has invalidated racial 
classifications that benefit a minority as well as those that benefit the 
majority.160 This area, though, remains very controversial. How 
would the question be analyzed using a game-theoretic model? 
The straightforward answer is the same answer dictated by other 
process-oriented theories of Equal Protection—that discrimination 
against a stable majority should not be subject to strict scrutiny. 
However, the reasoning behind this conclusion depends on how we 
characterize the political process leading to affirmative action-type 
 
 159. See Pamela S. Karlan, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Justice 
Blackmun, 26 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 59, 63–64 (1998) (proposing “double-barreled” judi-
cial review tying together liberty and equality interests). 
 160. See Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (race-based prefer-
ences in hiring contractors); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
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results. Under one view—probably the most supportable—
affirmative action is essentially the opposite of rent seeking; that is, it 
occurs when the majority itself agrees to provide a benefit to the mi-
nority. Under a view that the purpose of the Equal Protection Clause 
is to prevent a stable political majority from subordinating a stable 
political minority, this does not present a problem. Laws that are in-
tended to aid a minority do not subordinate it. 
Under another view of the political process, affirmative action is 
the result of a minority successfully creating a majority coalition that 
supports affirmative action by recruiting some of the (historical) ma-
jority coalition. Under this view, not only is the minority not being 
exploited by the majority, it is part of the majority. Assuming that 
the minority is a racial minority, this indicates that coalitions are 
forming along the lines of some factor other than race and, thus, that 
the political process is working as intended. In this case, as before, 
no reason exists to subject this sort of law to strict scrutiny.161 
D. The Role of Equal Protection Law 
A game-theoretic model of discrimination provides important 
lessons for the role of Equal Protection law in remedying specific acts 
of discrimination and in making discrimination less likely to occur in 
the long run. This model makes more explicit the Carolene Products 
notion that the democratic process can break down under certain 
situations, leaving a minority a persistent loser in rent-seeking situa-
tions. In a repeated cooperative bargaining game, players have an in-
centive, if possible, to form a stable majority coalition to seek rent at 
the expense of a stable minority. In this sort of situation, the ideal-
ized bargaining process envisioned in the Calculus of Consent,162 in 
which players ordinarily are able to enter winning coalitions a fair 
percentage of the time, does not work properly. Because a stable mi-
nority ordinarily cannot get recourse through the legislative process, 
the judiciary may appropriately step in and strike down legislation 
that discriminates against the stable minority. By doing this, the ju-
diciary can reduce the opportunities for the majority to seek rent at 
 
 161. It is worth noting, though, a counterargument that arises from the game-theoretic 
model. To the extent race (or any other trait) acts as a focal point for coalition formation, any 
type of discrimination based on race, including reverse discrimination, might reinforce an exist-
ing focal point. As described below, eliminating the use of certain traits as focal points for coa-
lition formation is an important function of Equal Protection law. 
 162. See BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 148–52. 
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the expense of the minority. 
In the longer run, Equal Protection law may have an even more 
important function. Under a rent-seeking model, discrimination be-
comes persistent because it becomes a focal point for coalition for-
mation and hence becomes internalized by society as a social norm. 
By eliminating possibilities for rent seeking, or by at least making 
rent seeking more difficult (raising transaction costs), Equal Protec-
tion law can eliminate the purpose of discrimination as a focal point. 
If a stable majority cannot seek benefits for itself at the expense of a 
minority, a strategy that involves forming a long-term stable coali-
tion will not be an equilibrium strategy. Instead, players will likely 
play something like an opportunistic strategy, entering into whatever 
coalition seems likely to provide the greatest short-term gain. Under 
this equilibrium, over time each player is likely to be able to join a 
majority coalition a fair percentage of the time. Thus, a function of 
Equal Protection law is to eliminate focal point strategies that subor-
dinate a minority. 
Over the even longer run, Equal Protection law can play a role in 
identifying and preventing new types of discrimination as they arise. 
Why would we expect new types of discrimination to arise? Equal 
Protection law can help eliminate the incentive to form a particular 
stable rent-seeking coalition—by prohibiting discrimination along 
the lines of whatever trait serves as the basis for the coalition—but it 
does not eliminate the incentive to form a stable majority coalition 
generally. That is, if discrimination based on a particular trait is 
eliminated as a focal point, rent-seeking coalitions might arise based 
on some other trait. For example, a reduction in rent-seeking oppor-
tunities based on race could result in people trying to seek rent using 
other forms of discrimination: on the basis of religion, homosexual-
ity, or some other trait. Thus, over the long run the list of suspect 
classifications should be treated as flexible and subject to change in 
the event that traits other than those recognized become the subject 
of persistent discrimination. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
This article proposes a game-theoretic model of discrimination 
that focuses on a group’s ability to form coalitions with other 
groups. It models the democratic process as a cooperative bargaining 
game in which players can form coalitions with other players. When 
this game is repeated, players have an incentive to maintain a stable 
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majority coalition to seek a long-term advantage for themselves at 
the expense of the excluded minority. The coalition that players will 
choose to form will likely be a focal point coalition that is particularly 
salient for some reason. 
This model provides a natural way to analyze whether a group is 
a “discrete and insular minority” within the meaning of Carolene 
Products. A discrete and insular minority is likely to be formed 
around a trait that is a natural focal point for the formation and 
maintenance of stable majority and minority coalitions. This article 
identifies several qualities that such a trait is likely to possess: it is 
likely to be immutable, to be evident, to divide society into easily 
separable groups that are each of a significant size, and to have a his-
tory of use for discrimination. These qualities provide a means of de-
termining whether a trait constitutes a suspect classification warrant-
ing a heightened degree of scrutiny. This article argues that Equal 
Protection law can not only prevent individual acts of discrimination, 
but, over time, also change social norms that favor building coali-
tions around certain traits. Thus, over time Equal Protection can 
help reduce the amount of discrimination in society. 
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Appendix A. The Definition of the Stable Set 
Given a coalition S, we say that a payout allocation x = (x1, x2, . . . 
, xn) is feasible for S if S has the power to obtain allocation x. For the 
purposes of the three-person divide-the-dollar game, an allocation is 
feasible for a coalition if (1) the coalition has at least two members, 
so that it constitutes a majority, and (2) the total payout to all three 
players is no greater than 1. For example, the allocation (1/3, 1/3, 
1/3) is feasible for the grand coalition of all players, but the alloca-
tion (1/2, 1/2, 1/2) is not. 
Allocation y dominates allocation x if some coalition S exists such 
that (1) y is feasible for S and (2) S prefers y to x; that is, the payout 
to each member of S is greater under allocation y than under alloca-
tion x. Intuitively, y dominates x if some group of players can do bet-
ter by forming coalition S and dividing the resulting payout among 
themselves. For example, in the divide-the-dollar game, Player 1 and 
2 can improve upon the allocation (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) by forming the 
coalition {1, 2} and dividing the dollar between themselves, yielding 
the allocation (1/2, 1/2, 0). 
Let V be a set of payout allocations for a cooperative game. The 
set V is internally stable if no allocation in V dominates any other al-
location in V. The set V is externally stable if every allocation outside 
of V is dominated by an allocation in V. A set that is both internally 
and externally stable is called a stable set, or a von Neumann and 
Morgenstern solution.163 A stable set has some appeal as the set of 
likely outcomes of a cooperative game. Any allocation outside of a 
stable set V will likely be replaced by an allocation within the stable 
set that dominates it. On the other hand, an allocation within V will 
not be replaced by any other allocation within V and is unlikely—so 
the theory goes—to be replaced by an allocation outside of V be-
cause that allocation would itself be unstable.164 
As a simple example, consider the following set V of outcomes of 
the divide-the-dollar game: 
 
{(1/2, 1/2, 0), (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2)} 
 
 
 163. The concept of the stable set as the solution to a cooperative game was proposed by 
John Von Neumann and Oskar Morgenstern in JOHN VON NEUMANN & OSKAR 
MORGENSTERN, THEORY OF GAMES AND ECONOMIC BEHAVIOR 263–66 (4th ed. 1972). 
 164. See MYERSON, supra note 14, at 453. 
2ROY.DOC 3/23/02  10:18 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2002 
102 
It is easy to check that none of these outcomes is dominated by 
either of the other two outcomes within the V. Similarly, any alloca-
tion not in V must give a payout of less than 1/2 to at least two 
players, and these players would prefer to form a coalition and switch 
to the allocation in V that gives them both 1/2. Thus, V is both in-
ternally and externally stable.165 
However, the stable set is deficient as a predictor of the likely 
outcome of a cooperative game. First, many games have more than 
one stable set, and some of these sets may include outcomes that 
seem very unlikely. For example, in the divide-the-dollar game, given 
any Player P and any number α < 1/2, the set of all allocations that 
allocates the entire dollar and gives a payout of α to Player P is a sta-
ble set.166 Thus, every allocation that divides the entire dollar is in 
some stable set, including allocations that seem intuitively unlikely. 
We can refine the notion of a stable set in order to capture the 
intuition that a minimum winning coalition is particularly likely to 
form. A main-simple stable set V is a stable set such that each alloca-
tion x in it can be associated with a minimum winning coalition that 
prefers x at least as much as any other outcome in V.167 The advan-
tage of a main-simple stable set is that it is unique for a game. For 
example, in the three-person divide-the-dollar game the unique 
main-simple stable set is {(1/2, 1/2, 0 ), (1/2, 0, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 
1/2)}.168 Political theorists commonly view this set as the set of allo-




 165. BUCHANAN & TULLOCK, supra note 7, at 149; MYERSON, supra note 14, at 453. 
 166. MYERSON, supra note 14, at 453; see ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 290. 
 167. ORDESHOOK, supra note 7, at 290–91. 
 168. Id. 
2ROY.DOC 3/23/02  10:18 AM 
53] Carolene Products: A Game-Theoretic Approach 
 103 
Appendix B. An Equilibrium Strategy in the Repeated 
Divide-the-Dollar Game 
This section provides a formal analysis of the repeated divide-the-
dollar game and a proof of the result suggested in Part II.A.2 of the 
article—that a discriminatory strategy is a stable equilibrium of the 
repeated game. 
In order to solve the repeated divide-the-dollar game, we impose 
a plausible bargaining structure onto it, transforming it into a re-
peated noncooperative game. The bargaining structure takes the 
form of a stage game, which is an n-player game divided into k 
stages. At each stage, one or more players may have a set of actions 
that he or she can take, and the players’ actions at one stage may af-
fect the actions available to players at subsequent stages. 
The divide-the-dollar game can be represented as a stage game 
by imposing a simple bargaining process onto it. Assuming that 
some allocation x exists at the beginning of the first stage, negotia-
tion occurs in the following three stages: 
(1) “Nature” picks one player i at random; 
(2) Player i proposes an allocation y of the dollar among the 
three players; and 
(3) The players vote on whether to adopt y in preference to x. If 
y is adopted, the players receive payout in accordance with al-
location y, and y becomes the beginning payout for the next 
round of the game. Otherwise, players are paid in accordance 
with allocation x, and x is the starting allocation for the next 
round. 
We can model the repeated divide-the-dollar game by repeating 
this stage game an infinite number of times. We assume that a dis-
count factor of δ applies between rounds (the players discount future 
payouts). A strategy si for player i is simply a rule that for each stage 
t, describes the action that i will select—or the probability of player i 
selecting a particular action—depending on the sequence of play up 
to that point. 
When this stage game is repeated an infinite number of times, 
each player will receive a payout each round of the game. A player’s 
total payout will be the discounted sum of the payouts that he re-
ceives each round. If each player i is playing some strategy si, we can 
compute the total payout that a player i will get if the repeated game 
begins with a given allocation x. That is, beginning with an alloca-
tion x, the game will follow a fixed path (or will have a determined 
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probability of following each of a number of paths), so we can de-
termine the total payout player i will receive by summing the pay-
outs, discounted by probability, that he will receive each round. The 
total payout to player i when the game starts from the allocation x 
can be denoted by vi(x). 
As defined so far, this game has many Nash equilibria. For exam-
ple, given any starting allocation x, the strategy profile under which 
every player always proposes x and votes only in favor of x is a Nash 
equilibrium.169 If the discount factor is high enough, many alloca-
tions can be supported as stable equilibria through the use of pun-
ishment strategies. For example, a supermajority170 of m players can 
play a strategy in which (1) a member of the supermajority always 
proposes and always votes for an allocation in which each member of 
the supermajority receives 1/m and each member of the minority re-
ceives 0, and (2) if any member of the supermajority defects, the re-
maining majority (the supermajority minus the defector) switches to 
a strategy that is the same in every respect except that the defecting 
player is treated as a member of the minority. If the discount factor is 
high enough, this strategy is a Nash equilibrium. 
In the interest of making the solutions to this game more plausi-
ble, we will place some—hopefully realistic—restrictions on the 
strategies that players can adopt. The point here is to make the as-
sumptions that are least likely to support discriminatory strategies. 
That is, we want to determine whether stable discriminatory strate-
gies are likely to emerge even if players have short memories and do 
not explicitly distinguish among other players.171 To begin with, we 
assume that all players play the “same” strategy. That is, Player 1’s 
strategy beginning from the allocation (x1, x2, x3) is the same as 
Player 2’s strategy beginning from (x2, x1, x3), and so forth. This 
eliminates strategies in which players make distinctions among the 
other players. Second, we will assume that the strategies are station-
ary, that is, the strategy within any subgame depends only on the 
subgame’s starting allocation. In other words, players have no mem-
ory of the history of play prior to the current stage game. This elimi-
 
 169. This is easy to see. No player can gain by either proposing or voting for an allocation 
other than x, because such an allocation will never get the majority necessary to be adopted. 
 170. A supermajority is a majority plus one player. If the game has only three players, of 
course, the only supermajority is the grand coalition. 
 171. The assumptions made here parallel those in David P. Baron & John A. Ferejohn, 
Bargaining in Legislatures, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1181 (1989). 
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nates the possibility of “punishment” strategies akin to the tit-for-tat 
strategy in the repeated prisoner’s dilemma. Finally, we will assume 
that the players play stage-undominated voting strategies. That is, 
given a current allocation x, a player i will vote for any proposal y 
such that vi(y) > vi(x). This assumption captures the intuition that 
players will vote in favor of any proposal that gives them a higher 
long-term payout than the current allocation. 
Since we are assuming that the players’ strategies are symmetri-
cal, we can define a strategy profile for the game by defining a strat-
egy for a given Player i. Let V denote the main-simple stable set for 
the n-person divide-the-dollar game.172 For a Player i, let Vi be the 
subset of V consisting of allocations that give Player i a non-zero 
payout.173 We define the “discriminatory” strategy as follows, given 
starting allocation x: 
Discriminatory strategy: 
Proposal strategy for Player i: 
If x ∈ Vi, propose that allocation. Otherwise, propose a ran-
domly selected allocation in Vi. 
Voting strategy for Player i: 
If x ∈ Vi, vote only for that allocation. 
Otherwise, 
 Always vote for any proposed y ∈ Vi. 
 Always vote against a proposed y ∈ V such that y ∉ Vi. 
 If y ∉ V, vote for y if and only if yi ≥ xi. 
Proposition 2. The discriminatory strategy is a stationary, sub-
game perfect equilibrium of the repeated n person divide-the-dollar 
game, with n odd, if the discount factor δ ≥ n/(n+1). 
Proof: The idea of the proof is to compute the value of various 
allocations and show that no allocation has a higher long-term value 
to Player 1, under any alternative strategy, than an allocation in V1. 
In the remainder of this section, s will represent the strategy profile 
under which all players play the discriminatory strategy, and v1(x) will 
represent the total discounted payout to Player 1 in the repeated 
stage game assuming that x is the starting allocation and all players 
play strategy profile s. Since we will be comparing s to other strate-
 
 172. This set consists of all allocations under which a minimum winning coalition divides 
the pot equally among its members. So, for example, the set V for the three-person game is 
{(½, ½, 0), (½, 0, ½), (0, ½, ½)}. 
 173. In the three-person case, for example, V1 = {(½, ½, 0), (½, 0, ½)}. 
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gies Player 1 might play, we will let s' denote a strategy profile under 
which all players other than Player 1 play the discriminatory strategy, 
and Player 1 plays some other strategy. We will denote by v'1(x) the 
total discounted payout to Player 1 assuming that x is the starting al-
location and the players are using strategy profile s'. 
The discriminatory strategy s is a subgame perfect equilibrium of 
the repeated game if it is a Nash equilibrium of every induced stage 
game—that is, if Player 1 cannot improve his total payout by chang-
ing his strategy in any stage. The discriminatory strategy s requires 
Player 1 always to propose some x ∈ V1 and also to vote for any allo-
cation in V1. Player 1 can improve upon s only if he can improve his 
total payout by either proposing (and voting for) some y ∉ V1 instead 
of x ∈ V1 or else by voting down some x ∈ V1 in order to retain an 
existing allocation y ∉ V1. Thus, Player 1 can improve on the dis-
criminatory strategy only if there exists some alternative strategy pro-
file s' and some allocation y such that v'1(y) > v1(x) for any x ∈ V1. 
We begin by calculating v1(x) for x ∈ V1. An allocation in V gives 
an equal payout to each member of some minimum winning coali-
tion. A minimum winning coalition has exactly (n + 1)/2 members, 
so each member receives a payout of 2/(n + 1). Therefore, any allo-
cation x in V1 gives Player 1 a payout of x1 = 2/(n + 1). If all players 
play the discriminatory strategy, and x ∈ V1 is the starting allocation, 
then x will be adopted every round of the game. Thus, the long term 
value of x to Player 1 is equal to v1(x) = x1 + δx1 + δ
2x1 + . . . =  
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We also note that if the starting allocation x is in V but not V1, 
then x will be adopted every round regardless of what Player 1 does. 
Player 1 will get a payout of zero every round, and v1(x) = 0. 
Now we calculate the maximal value of v'1(y) under any alterative 
strategy. 
Lemma 1: Let x be any allocation in V1. Assume there exists 
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Where y' is Player 1’s proposal under strategy s'. 
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Proof of Lemma 1: We will compute the value v'1(y) by analyz-
ing the subgame beginning with y. If y is the starting allocation, 
Player 1 gets an immediate payout of y1. The subgame starting with 
allocation y can proceed in three ways: 
(1) Player 1 is selected as the proposer (a 1/n chance). Then 
Player 1 will propose allocation y'. We can assume y' will be ap-
proved, because otherwise Player 1 would gain nothing from playing 
it. The continuation value to Player 1 = δv'1(y'). 
(2) Some other Player i is selected as proposer (a chance of (n + 
1)/n). Player i will propose an allocation x in V that gives Player i a 
non-zero payout. There are two possibilities: 
(a) x ∈ V1 (1/2 chance). Then Player 1 will vote against x, since 
by hypothesis y is better for him than x. So x will be voted down, and 
y will remain in effect. The continuation value to Player 1 is δv'1(y). 
(b) x ∉ V1 (1/2 chance). Then x will be approved, since Player 
1’s vote is not required for its approval. Then, since x will be ap-
proved in every subsequent round as well, Player 1 will get a payout 
of 0 every round. The continuation value to Player 1 is 0. 
Adding the continuation values to Player 1 from each of these 
outcomes, discounted by the probability of each outcome, gives the 
result in Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2: Let z = (1, 0, 0, . . . , 0) denote the allocation under 
which Player 1 receives the entire dollar and all other players in the 
game receive 0. Let x be any allocation in V1. If there exists y such 
that v'1(y) > v1(x), then v'1(z) ≥ v'1(y). 
Proof of Lemma 2: From Lemma 1 we know that v'1(y) de-
pends only on y1 (the payout to Player 1 under allocation y), and 
v'1(y') (the value of whatever proposal Player 1 makes if the existing 
allocation is y and he is selected as proposer). Obviously y1 is maxi-
mized when y = z. It is also easy to see that v'1(y') is maximized when 
y = z. We know that v'1(y') ≥ v'1(y), or else Player 1 would not pro-
pose y'. Thus, y' ∉ V1, and a fortiori y ∉ V. Therefore, a Player i who 
is playing the “discriminatory” strategy will vote for y' if y'i ≥ yi. Ob-
viously, this will always be the case if y = z. So if y = z, then y' will be 
adopted regardless of what it is, and Player 1 can choose the y' that 
gives him the highest payout. (We can see, of course, that if y = z 
then y' = z also). Thus, v'1(y) is maximized if y = z, so v'1(z) ≥ v'1(y). 
Proof of Proposition 2: As described above, we need to show 
that, for any strategy s' that Player 1 might choose, and for any y ∉ 
V1, x ∈ V1, we must have v1(x) ≥ v'1(y). From Lemma 2, we know 
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that the value of y is maximized if y = z. Thus, it is sufficient to show 
that v1(x) ≥ v'1(z). We can compute the minimal value of v'1(z) from 
the formula in Lemma 1, since we know z1 = 1 and v'1(z) is maxi-
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Thus, v'1(z) is just equal to a payout stream discounted by the 


























Solving for δ, we find that v1(x) ≥ v'1(z) whenever δ ≥ n/(n+1). 
Obviously, this result becomes less meaningful as the number of 
players in the game becomes large. For example, in the case of the 
three-person game, the discriminatory strategy is stable whenever δ ≥ 
3/4. However, as n gets arbitrarily large, the discriminatory strategy 
appears to be unstable (or at least not stable for purely strategic rea-
sons) unless δ is arbitrarily close to 1. As described in the body of 
this article, rent-seeking situations may be modeled as bargaining 
games in which the players are a small number of groups. For exam-
ple, bargaining in the employment context can be modeled as a 
three-player game in which the players are the employer, majority 
employees, and minority employees. Therefore, this result provides 
meaningful insights into the dynamics of political bargaining situa-
tions. 
In reality, as the number of players in the game becomes arbitrar-
ily large, coalition-formation costs are likely to become a much more 
important factor than purely strategic considerations. For example, 
suppose that some minimum winning coalition currently exists and is 
dividing the pot equally among its members. Suppose further that 
Player 1 has the option of proposing some new allocation y sup-
ported by a different majority coalition. In the above proof, we as-
sumed that Player 1 had the power to obtain the allocation (1, 0, 
0, . . ., 0), under which Player 1 received the entire pot and the re-
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maining players received 0. In reality, Player 1 is unlikely to achieve 
anything close to this, particularly when the number of players is 
large, because other players are likely to demand at least some mini-
mum payment in order to compensate them for the time and cost of 
bargaining and for the opportunity cost of giving up the pursuit of 
other outcomes. This will reduce the value of opportunistic renego-
tiation and make coalitions more stable once they are formed. In par-
ticular, coalition-formation costs can make the discriminatory strat-
egy stable at lower discount factors than indicated above.  
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